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INTRODUCTION 
A discussion of the modern procedures for processing and 
adjudicating the immigration status of unaccompanied alien children 
(UACs)—non-citizen children who are unaccompanied by their parents 
and come into contact with immigration authorities—must begin in 
1985 with the filing of the Flores lawsuit, federal litigation that remains 
ongoing.1  Much of the current law regarding these minor migrants has 
its genesis in that litigation.2  Yet, we are currently in the midst of an 
era that began much more recently, an ongoing reality that the Obama 
administration called a humanitarian crisis and the Trump 
administration has deemed a threat to national security and our very 
identity as the United States.3  Through myriad administrative actions, 
various officials within the current administration have methodically 
narrowed UACs’ ability to lawfully remain in the United States.  In 
                                                          
1. See, e.g., Order Denying Defendants’ “Ex Parte Application for Limited 
Relief from Settlement Agreement,” Flores v. Sessions, CV 85-4544-DMG (AGRx) 
(C.D. Cal. July 9, 2018).  
2. See Stipulated Settlement Agreement, Flores v. Reno, CV 85-4544-RJK (Px) 
(C.D. Cal. filed Jan. 17, 1997).  
3. Compare Tim Hull, Humanitarian Crisis on the U.S. Border, COURTHOUSE 
NEWS SERV. (June 11, 2014), https://www.courthousenews.com/humanitarian-crisis-
on-the-u-s-border/ (“President Barack Obama called the influx ‘an urgent 
humanitarian situation requiring a unified and coordinated federal response.’”), with 
Seung Min Kim, Trump Warns Against Admitting Unaccompanied Migrant Children: 
‘They’re Not Innocent,’ WASH. POST (May 23, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-warns-against-admitting-
unaccompanied-migrant-children-theyre-not-innocent/2018/05/23/e4b24a68-5ec2-
11e8-8c93-8cf33c21da8d_story.html (“Trump added: ‘They look so innocent. 
They’re not innocent.’”). 
2
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doing so, the current administration has intentionally manufactured a 
massive and ever-growing population of non-citizen children who will 
be without lawful status.  As such, a self-fulfilling prophecy has 
emerged: many UACs will remain in the United States without lawful 
immigration status and employment authorization, leaving them 
permanent outsiders to the community. 
The arrival of UACs to the United States is not new, but between 
2011 and 2013, the number of UACs arriving doubled, and the numbers 
doubled again in 2014.4  At the time, the sudden arrival of tens of 
thousands of children was seen as a “surge”—a temporary increase to 
be addressed (humanely) and overcome.5  The children were processed 
according to existing law and policy simply in increased numbers.  The 
government added new facilities to ensure the children were cared for 
in accordance with the Flores settlement and the federal laws enacted 
to comply with that settlement.6  The children were generally 
unhindered in seeking the lawful immigration status for which they may 
have been eligible.  Indeed, while the Obama administration (consistent 
with federal law) vehemently opposed legal challenges demanding that 
these children be appointed government-funded counsel, the 
                                                          
4. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. BORDER PATROL TOTAL 
MONTHLY UAC APPREHENSIONS BY SECTOR (FY 2010 – FY 2017) (July 2, 2018), 
https://www.cbp.gov/document/stats/us-border-patrol-total-monthly-uac-
apprehensions-sector-fy-2010-fy-2017 [hereinafter TOTAL MONTHLY UAC 
APPREHENSIONS]; OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUM. SERV., FACTS AND DATA (May 18, 2019), 
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/about/ucs/facts-and-data [hereinafter FACTS AND DATA]; 
see also U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Children on the Run 4 (2014) 
[hereinafter Children on the Run]. 
5. See Press Release, President Barack Obama, Office of the Press Secretary, 
Response to the Influx of Unaccompanied Alien Children Across the Southwest 
Border (June 2, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2014/06/02/presidential-memorandum-response-influx-unaccompanied-alien-
children-acr (instructing federal agencies to coordinate in responding to the 
“humanitarian aspects” of the “influx” of UACs consistent with existing law). 
6. See, e.g., Michael D. Shear & Jeremy W. Peters, Obama Asks for $3.7 Billion 
to Aid Border, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/us/obama-seeks-billions-for-children-
immigration-crisis.html. 
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administration nonetheless supported efforts to ensure that these 
children had access to free legal counsel.7 
The change from the Obama administration to the Trump 
administration saw a fundamental shift as to how the federal 
government views UACs.  Federal executives have altered legal 
interpretation, administrative processing, and policy implementation of 
immigration laws regarding UACs.  Each change has decreased the 
likelihood that individual UACs will be granted immigration status and 
permitted to permanently and lawfully reside in the United States.  
Some of these changes have made immediate repatriation more likely, 
but others likely disincentivize compliance with the law.  This article 
will address how this has occurred in three areas: (1) greater hindrances 
to UACs being released from federal detention; (2) narrowed 
opportunities for UACs to apply for and be granted asylum; and (3) 
decreased eligibility for abandoned, abused, and neglected UACs to 
seek permanent residency. 
Certain facts are beyond dispute, but perception can be influential.  
It is an indisputable fact that hundreds of thousands of UACs arrived to 
the United States in the last several years.8  If UACs are denied access 
to the legal protections the law provides for them, they will either be 
deported or remain an underclass permanently excluded from full 
participation in society.  UACs do not need to be confined to such a 
future.  The narrative matters. 
I.  A VERY BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO UNITED STATES  
IMMIGRATION LAW 
The United States Constitution establishes that certain 
individuals—the vast majority of those persons born within the territory 
                                                          
7. Compare J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1038 (9th Cir. 2016) (dismissing 
on jurisdictional grounds a suit brought by unaccompanied minors claiming 
constitutional and statutory right to appointed counsel), with Press Release, U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, Justice Department and CNCS Announce $1.8 Million in Grants to 
Enhance Immigration Court Proceedings and Provide Legal Assistance to 
Unaccompanied Children (Sept. 12, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-
department-and-cncs-announce-18-million-grants-enhance-immigration-court-
proceedings (announcing Justice Department collaboration to ensure UACs are 
represented). 
8. See sources cited supra note 4. 
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of the United States—are citizens of this country.9  Congress has 
legislated additional classes of people who are citizens or non-citizen 
nationals of the United States.10  And, pursuant to its constitutional 
authority, Congress has established laws for the naturalization of certain 
immigrants—the process by which noncitizens become citizens.11 
Everyone else must have permission from the U.S. government to 
enter or be present in the country.12  Explicit (and distinct) permission 
is also required for a noncitizen to work in the United States.13  
Noncitizens who have been granted permission to enter or be present in 
the United States may lose such permission for a variety of reasons.14  
Conduct that may subject a noncitizen to deportation ranges from 
staying longer than permitted to committing a crime.15  Others will be 
found ineligible for admission to the United States for reasons 
including, but not limited to, being poor or sick, having committed 
certain crimes, supporting terrorist organizations, or having any prior 
negative immigration history.16 
When immigration officers identify a noncitizen without lawful 
permission to enter or be present in the United States, the officers may 
begin the formal process to “remove” that individual from the 
                                                          
9. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of 
the State wherein they reside.”). 
10. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952 §§ 301-309, ch. 477, 66 
Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (Westlaw 2019)).   
11. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 4 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To 
establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.”); INA § 310. 
12. See INA § 291. 
13. Id. § 274A. 
14. See generally id. § 237 (listing classes of deportable alien). 
15. See, e.g., id. § 237(a)(1)(C) (“Any alien who was admitted as a 
nonimmigrant and who has failed to maintain the nonimmigrant status . . . is 
deportable.”), (2)(A)(i) (“Any alien who (I) is convicted of a crime involving moral 
turpitude committed within five years . . . after the date of admission . . . is 
deportable.”).  
16. Id. § 212(a)(1)(A) (aliens with certain communicable diseases are 
inadmissible), (2) (aliens with certain criminal histories are inadmissible), (3) (aliens 
with terrorist connections are inadmissible), (4)(A) (aliens likely to become public 
charges are inadmissible), (6)(A) (aliens who entered the United States unlawfully are 
inadmissible), (9) (aliens with prior deportations or prior incidents of unlawful 
presence are inadmissible). 
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country.17  The arresting officer may come into contact with the 
noncitizen at a port of entry, while patrolling the border, or anywhere 
within the United States.18  The officer may charge the noncitizen as 
subject to deportation for violating the terms of a lawful entry or simply 
for lacking lawful immigration status.19 
The legal process to which the noncitizen is entitled varies greatly 
based on the facts of the case.20  In some cases, the noncitizen receives 
nothing more than an interview with the arresting officer.21  In other 
situations, the noncitizen will have the benefit of a quasi-judicial 
administrative proceeding before an immigration judge.22  Depending 
on the circumstances, the noncitizen may be held in civil detention for 
the duration of the proceeding, which may last months to years.23 
                                                          
17. See id. §§ 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I) (expeditious removal of certain aliens 
“without further hearing or review”), 236(a) (arrest of aliens pending removal 
proceedings), 238(a) (removal of criminal aliens), 239(a) (initiation of removal 
proceedings). 
18. Compare INA § 235(a)(1), with id. § 236(a). 
19. See INA §§ 237(a) (grounds of deportability for alien previously admitted 
but subject to removal), 212(a) (grounds of inadmissibility for alien seeking 
admission). 
20. Compare INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii) (allowing for expeditious “remov[al] from 
the United States without further hearing or review” if a recently arrived alien without 
entry documents does not express a fear of harm in country of origin), with id. § 240 
(giving certain aliens the right to quasi-judicial administrative proceedings before an 
immigration judge). Prior to the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), there was a clear division between 
noncitizens on United States soil to whom the whole panoply of due process rights 
was owed in formal deportation proceedings and those noncitizens who presented at 
a port of entry and were entitled to much diminished process in exclusion proceedings.  
IIRIRA merged the two and created a grey middle for those noncitizens who are 
present in the United States but have not been admitted or paroled after inspection by 
an immigration officer. Such unadmitted but present noncitizens, if recently, arrived 
are entitled to limited rights when appearing before an immigration judge.  INA § 
235(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii)(II).  
21. INA § 235(b); see also 8 C.F.R. § 235.3 (2019). 
22. INA § 240; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1. 
23. INA §§ 235(b)(2)(A) (“an alien seeking admission . . . shall be detained for 
a proceeding under section [240 Removal Proceedings]”); 236(a) (allowing for 
detention of the alien pending removal proceedings or release upon the posting of 
bond or conditional parole). The Supreme Court has held there is a liberty interest at 
stake for noncitizens detained by the immigration authorities. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. 
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (“A statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien 
6
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Many noncitizens will be deported from the United States without 
delay because they do not have lawful immigration status to enter or 
remain in the country.24  However, the law allows some noncitizens to 
apply for specific remedies to avoid deportation.25  Included among 
those remedies are a number of humanitarian protections—
opportunities that Congress has legislated—to avoid deporting certain 
noncitizens.  Asylum is one such remedy, but it is not the only available 
path to protection from deportation.26  The law also protects certain 
vulnerable noncitizens including, but not limited to, those who: (1) are 
likely to suffer torture upon return to their country;27 (2) have long 
resided in the United States without immigration status but whose 
deportation will cause exceptional harm to a qualifying U.S. citizen 
relative;28 (3) have suffered domestic violence perpetrated by a citizen 
or permanent resident family member;29 (4) have been victims of crime 
or human trafficking;30 (5) come from certain countries currently 
                                                          
would raise a serious constitutional problem.”). As at least some of the immigration 
laws seem to allow indefinite detention, see INA § 235(b)(2)(A), it is perhaps not 
surprising that some federal courts have read into the immigration law an implicit 
right to consideration for release from detention after detention becomes prolonged. 
See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that most 
or all noncitizens in immigration detention have the right to a bond hearing after 
detention becomes prolonged). The Supreme Court subsequently held, however, that 
there is no implicit right to a bond hearing after immigration detention becomes 
prolonged, but the constitutionality of the immigration law’s apparent authorization 
of indefinite detention remains to be decided. Jennings v. Rodríguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 
876 (2018). 
24. INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(i) (applying expedited removal to aliens inadmissible 
simply for not having lawful entry documents). 
25. Id. § 240(c)(4) (establishing requirements for applications for relief from 
removal before an immigration judge). 
26. Id. § 208(a) (allowing broad latitude in applying for asylum). 
27. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16 (2019) (withholding of removal under the United 
Nations Convention Against Torture), .17 (deferral of removal under the United 
Nations Convention Against Torture).  
28. INA § 240A(b)(1) (cancellation of removal for certain nonpermanent 
residents). 
29. Id. § 240A(b)(2) (special rule cancellation of removal for battered spouse or 
child). 
30. Id. § 101(a)(15)(T) (victims of severe forms of human trafficking), (U) 
(victims of other crimes who cooperate with law enforcement). 
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experiencing the effects of natural disasters or civil unrest;31 or (6) are 
children who have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by their 
parents.32 
The outcome of seeking any of these remedies, however, is never 
guaranteed; and for many noncitizens placed in removal proceedings 
there is no relief from removal available.33  With limited exceptions, 
immigration proceedings end in one of two ways: the noncitizen gets to 
stay in the United States with lawful immigration status or the 
noncitizen must leave.  The latter is the more common outcome.34 
II.  AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL PROCESSING OF UACS 
Unaccompanied Alien Children existed long before the term was 
created.35  Presumably, such children have interacted with the relevant 
authorities for as long as modern immigration enforcement has existed.  
But the definition of a UAC is much newer, having only been codified 
in its current form in 2002.36 
Before discussing what it means to be a UAC, it is crucial to 
understand what such a designation does not mean.  UACs, like all 
noncitizens, are subject to removal from the United States and 
deportation to their country of nationality.37  The mere fact of being a 
noncitizen present but without lawful immigration status in the United 
States is enough to earn UACs, even infants, one-way tickets back to 
                                                          
31. Id. § 244 (temporary protected status). 
32. Id. § 101(a)(27)(J) (special immigrant juvenile classification). 
33. See, e.g., EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, STATISTICS YEARBOOK FISCAL YEAR 2017 14 figs.7 & 8 (2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1107056/download [hereinafter STATISTICS 
YEARBOOK] (showing that orders of removal far outpace grants of immigration relief). 
34. Id. 
35. Ample popular sources, and a bronze statue, suggest that the first immigrant 
processed through New York’s Ellis Island when it opened in 1892 was a teenager 
who was likely unaccompanied. See Sam Roberts, Story of the First Through Ellis 
Island Is Rewritten, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2006), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/14/nyregion/14annie.html. 
36. See 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2), Pub. L. 107-296, tit. IV, § 462, 116 Stat. 2202 
(2002). 
37. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 
2008 (TVPRA 2008) § 235(a)(5)(D)(i), Pub. L. 110-457, tit. II, 122 Stat. 5077 (2008) 
(directing that UACs be placed in removal proceedings before an immigration judge). 
8
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their countries of origin.38  In other words, UAC classification alone 
does not grant the child any substantive lawful immigration status in 
the United States; instead, the classification affects how the child will 
be processed through the immigration system and, possibly, the 
remedies available to the child and how those remedies may be 
accessed.39 
A. The Flores Litigation and Settlement 
This discussion begins before being a “UAC” was even a legal 
status, when a proto-UAC, Jenny Flores, a noncitizen child, sued the 
United States government in 1985.40  At the time, noncitizen children 
arrested without their parents by immigration officers were treated not 
dissimilarly than adults.41  These children were detained by the same 
officials who detained adults, and there were no special provisions for 
them notwithstanding their inherent status as especially vulnerable 
minors.42  The Flores litigation sought to change that. 
The litigation continued for years.  Over a decade after the litigation 
began, the government and plaintiffs agreed to a consent decree, which 
became known as the Flores Settlement.43  The agreement contains 
many provisions, but its overall sentiment is especially noteworthy.  
                                                          
38. See, e.g., STATISTICS YEARBOOK, supra note 33, at 33 (listing rates of in 
absentia orders of removal for UACs as well as all other aliens in removal 
proceedings). 
39. See, e.g., TVPRA 2008, § 235(b), (c), (d). 
40. Complaint at 5, Flores v. Meese, 681 F. Supp. 665 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (No. 
85-4544 RJK(Px)) (suit brought by a noncitizen immigrant minor and similarly 
situated individuals who were held in U.S. government custody pending deportation 
proceedings, alleging inappropriate and unlawful treatment in the relevant processes). 
41. Id. at 2-3 (“[Immigration officers] regularly place persons under the age of 
eighteen (18) years under administrative arrest . . . . Like adults, juveniles arrested 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1252 are entitled to release on bail while deportation proceedings 
are conducted . . . . While in [immigration] detention, plaintiffs and those similarly 
situated are required to share sleeping quarters with unrelated adults. Juveniles so 
detained are provided no educational instruction, no educational or other reading 
materials, and no supervised recreational activity. Plaintiffs and those similarly 
situated are also denied reasonable visitation with family or friends.”). 
42. Id. 
43. See Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra note 2.  
9
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The settlement disfavored the detention of children.44  It set clear 
limitations on how long noncitizen children, including UACs, could be 
held in immigration custody for the simple sake of detention.45  When 
it was determined that a child could not be released to a family member, 
the child would not remain in immigration custody but instead would 
be shifted to the physical custody of a licensed program.46  It required 
the government to inform children of their rights and to allow children 
to challenge their ongoing detention.47  This shifted the focus of the 
process of detaining UACs—they were no longer ordinary subjects of 
detention but vulnerable children needing specialized care and 
protection.48 
B. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 fundamentally reorganized the 
federal government’s staffing of immigration enforcement (as well as a 
host of other functions).49  It shifted all responsibility for immigration 
enforcement as well as the majority of responsibility for administrative 
processing of immigration applications from the Department of 
Justice’s Immigration and Naturalization Service to several sub-
agencies of the newly-created Department of Homeland Security.50 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 also codified many of the 
crucial elements of the Flores Settlement.51  It also introduced an 
additional federal agency into the world of immigration processing: 
UACs would be held in the physical custody not of the immigration 
                                                          
44. Id. at 7 (“The [immigration authority] shall place each detained minor in the 
least restrictive setting appropriate to the minor’s age and special needs, . . . and to 
protect the minor’s well-being and that of others.”), 9-10 (“Where the [immigration 
authority] determines that the detention of the minor is not required either to secure 
his or her timely appearance before the [immigration authority] or the immigration 
court, or to ensure the minor’s safety or that of others, the [immigration authority] 
shall release a minor from its custody without unnecessary delay . . . .”). 
45. Id. at 8. 
46. Id. at 12. 
47. Id. at 7. 
48. See, e.g., id. at 11-12. 
49. Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA 2002) §§ 411, 442, 451, 471, Pub. L. 
107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).   
50. Id. § 456. 
51. Id. § 462(b). 
10
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enforcement authorities but instead in the federal Department of Health 
and Human Services.52  While the act primarily focuses on transferring 
functions to the newly-created department (from the Departments of 
Treasury, Transportation, and Justice, among others), this is not the case 
for the care and custody of UACs.53  These provisions altered not only 
who would be responsible for the task of detaining UACs, but also the 
priorities of the federal government.  The newly created priorities of the 
federal government involve the child’s welfare during detention, 
expeditious release from detention considering the child’s safety, and 
the child’s access to independent counsel.54 
C. The William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act of 2008 
In 2008, Congress advanced protecting UACs a step further when 
it promulgated the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act.  This law primarily focused on protecting victims 
and survivors of human trafficking, but it also implicitly recognized that 
all UACs are vulnerable to human trafficking and thus require special 
protection upon apprehension by federal immigration agents.55  
Crucially, apprehended UACs would be screened for indicators of 
having been trafficked.56 
This law also refined how UACs would be processed.  UACs must 
be transferred to Health and Human Services’ custody within seventy-
two hours of apprehension, and that agency then seeks to release each 
UAC from custody to the care of a safe sponsor as soon as possible.57  
Additionally, such children must be placed in formal administrative 
removal proceedings before an immigration judge; they are not 
expeditiously removed from the United States upon the unreviewable 
decision of an immigration officer as occurs with noncitizen adults and 
accompanied children.58  But the law created an important exception: a 
                                                          
52. Id. § 462(a). 
53. Compare id. § 462(a), with e.g., id. §§ 411, 421, 423, 441, 451(b). 
54. Id. § 462(b)(1). 
55. TVPRA 2008 § 235(a), Pub. L. 110-457, tit. II, 122 Stat. 5077 (2008). 
56. See id. § 235(a)(4). 
57. Id. § 235(b)(1), (3). 
58. Compare INA § 235, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8 U.S.C. (Westlaw 2019)), with TVPRA 2008 § 235(a)(5)(D). 
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UAC from a contiguous country (i.e., Mexico or Canada) can be 
quickly repatriated to their country of origin but only if: (1) there are no 
indications of human trafficking; (2) the child does not indicate a fear 
of persecution in the home country or express an intent to apply for 
asylum; and (3) the child has the capacity to choose to return to the 
child’s country of origin.59  If not all three of these requirements are 
met—or if it cannot be determined within forty-eight hours that the 
three requirements are met—the child will not be repatriated without 
receiving all the benefits available to other UACs, including transfer to 
Health and Human Services custody, consideration for release to a safe 
sponsor, and formal removal proceedings before an immigration 
judge.60  The law also established important amendments to the laws 
regarding UACs’ access to asylum and special immigrant juvenile 
status, which will be discussed below. 
D. The Current Definition of a UAC 
Perhaps most importantly for this discussion, the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 codified the definition of a UAC, and the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 reaffirmed 
it.61  Interestingly, the definition is not codified in Title 8 of the United 
States Code, which relates generally to immigration and nationality, but 
instead it is codified in Title 6, which relates to domestic security.  The 
protections available to UACs refer to the definition now found at 
Section 279(g)(2) of Title 6 of the United States Code: 
The term ‘‘unaccompanied alien child’’ means a child who— 
    (A) has no lawful immigration status in the United States; 
    (B) has not attained 18 years of age; and 
    (C) with respect to whom— 
          (i) there is no parent or legal guardian in the United States; or 
         (ii) no parent or legal guardian in the United States is available 
to provide care and physical custody.62 
                                                          
59. TVPRA 2008 § 235(a)(2). 
60. Id. § 235(a)(4). 
61. HSA 2002 § 462(g)(2), Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002); see also 
TVPRA 2008 § 235(g). 
62. 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2), Pub. L. 107-296, tit. IV, § 462, 116 Stat. 2202 (2002). 
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At first glance, this definition seems simple and straightforward.  
Yet, its simplicity is misleading.  Neither the definition itself nor the 
sections that cross-reference it contain a temporal explanation; it is not 
clear when the definition is considered and applied, when the relevant 
protections attach, and when, if ever, such protections are lost.  These 
questions, as will be discussed below, have become crucial and have 
allowed great leeway in decisions by the administration of how to 
protect (or refuse to protect) UACs. 
E. Proposed Regulations 
As previously noted, many of the protections afforded to UACs—
especially those regarding their detention, care, and custody—have 
their roots in the Flores Settlement.  As modified in 2001, the settlement 
and consent decree will terminate upon full adoption of its provisions 
into law and regulation.63  Yet, despite the passage of the laws discussed 
above, litigants, including the United States government, continued to 
recognize that the settlement provisions were binding; for years, 
implementing regulations were not promulgated.64  The Trump 
administration has sought to change that. 
In 2018, the Departments of Homeland Security and Health and 
Human Services jointly published a notice of proposed rulemaking in 
the Federal Register.65  The proposal indicated an intention to enact 
regulations implementing the settlement provisions, thereby 
terminating the settlement agreement.66  Advocates, not surprisingly, 
expressed concern over the proposed regulations.67  Given the track 
                                                          
63. Apprehension, Processing, Care, and Custody of Alien Minors and 
Unaccompanied Alien Children, 83 Fed. Reg. 45,486, 45,486 (Sept. 7, 2018) (joint 
proposed regulations by the Departments of Homeland Security and Health and 
Human Services).  
64. Id. at 45,487-88. 
65. See generally id. 
66. Id. 
67. See, e.g., Letter from Immigration & Nationality Law Comm., Children & 
the Law Comm., Council on Children, Family Court & Family Law Comm., & Int’l 
Human Rights Comm., N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n to Debbie Seguin, Assistant Dir., Office of 
Policy, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. 2 (Nov. 
6, 2018) (“However, the Proposed Rules contravene the substance and purpose of the 
[Flores Settlement Agreement], and their publication is therefore insufficient to 
trigger the termination of the [Flores Settlement Agreement].”). 
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record of the current administration of narrowing protections for UACs, 
such concern appeared warranted. 
On August 23, 2019, these two departments published the final rule 
in the Federal Register.68  The departments noted the concerns 
expressed by various commenters and explained how the rules had been 
amended after the notice and comment period.69  As expected, the 
administration stated that the publication of the final rule effectively 
terminated the Flores agreement.70  Advocates for UACs were quick to 
disagree and plaintiffs’ counsel in the Flores litigation sought to have 
the administration enjoined from implementing the final rule.71  The 
federal district judge presiding over the Flores litigation agreed that the 
new regulations were inconsistent with the Flores agreement and 
enjoined the government from implementation.72  It is fair to assume 
that this dispute is not settled. 
III.  WHO ARE THE UACS AND WHY ARE THEY ARRIVING? 
UACs are, by no means, a homogenous group of children.  UACs 
hail from all corners of the world and speak hundreds of languages.  
UACs include cisgender and transgender boys and girls and gender-
nonconforming children.73  They range in age from days old to days 
short of turning eighteen.  Some have known significant economic 
privilege while others left behind abject poverty; some have completed 
secondary or even tertiary education while others have never seen a 
classroom and cannot write their own names.  In short, being a UAC 
has nothing to do with a child’s identity but rather their transitory place 
                                                          
68. Apprehension, Processing, Care, and Custody of Alien Minors and 
Unaccompanied Alien Children, 84 Fed. Reg. 44,392, 44,392 (Aug. 23, 2019) (joint 
final regulations promulgated by the Departments of Homeland Security and Health 
and Human Services). 
69. Id. at 44,395-96. 
70. See id. at 44,393. 
71. See Order Re. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Enforce Settlement and Defendants’ 
Notice of Termination of Settlement and Motion in the Alternative to Terminate 
Flores Settlement Agreement at 1, Flores v. Barr, CV 85-4544-DMG (AGRx) (C.D. 
Cal. Sept. 27, 2019).  
72. Id. at 5, 24. 
73. This article strives to use gender neutral pronouns.  
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in the United States immigration system as tempered by their age, 
custodial status, location in this country, and lack of immigration status. 
That being said, there are some noteworthy demographic trends.  
Statistically, the prototypical UAC is—and has been for years—a 
Guatemalan male in his late teens.74  But the last few years have seen 
important and concerning demographic shifts.  The percentage of 
younger, arriving UACs has increased.75  According to the Department 
of Health and Human Services, in fiscal year 2012, only 11% of UACs 
were age twelve and under; in fiscal year 2017, this number rose to 
17%.76  During that same period, the gender percentages of UACs 
shifted: the percentage of girls rose from 23% to 32%.77  These 
percentages must be considered in light of the increased number of 
UAC apprehensions during the last five years.  Customs and Border 
Protection reported that apprehensions of UACs increased from sixteen 
thousand in fiscal year 2011 to a peak of over sixty-eight thousand in 
fiscal year 2014.78  The inherent increased vulnerability of younger 
children is obvious.  While travel to the United States is horrendously 
dangerous for all immigrants, especially UACs, the prevalence of 
gender-based violence, sexual assault, and rape adds an additional layer 
of danger for girls.  Tens of thousands of additional UACs traveling to 
the United States per year thus means thousands of additional especially 
vulnerable children. 
There are some important caveats to this data.  Statistics regarding 
UACs—at least those published by Health and Human Services—
generally only include those children transferred to that agency.  Since 
Mexican (and Canadian) children are from contiguous countries and 
thus can be quickly returned to countries of origin if there are no 
indicators of human trafficking and they do not express a fear of return, 
those children may well be arriving in large numbers but only the 
fraction that are transferred to Health and Human Services are counted 
                                                          
74. FACTS AND DATA, supra note 4. See generally WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN: AN OVERVIEW (2017). 
75. FACTS AND DATA, supra note 4 (comparing data on UACs ranging in age 
between 0 to 12 years old). 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. KANDEL, supra note 74, at 2. 
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in government-published statistics on UACs.79  It is also important to 
note that UACs are not only children who have just arrived to the United 
States.  On the contrary, any noncitizen child found within the United 
States, without immigration status, and not in the care of a parent is 
classified as a UAC according to the plain language of the definition.  
When a federal immigration agent performs enforcement activities 
within the United States and encounters such a child, the officer must 
follow the protocol to transfer the child to Health and Human Services 
custody.  As a practical matter, however, the vast majority of UACs 
processed in recent years have been children who very recently arrived 
to the United States and were encountered by immigration agents at the 
ports of entry or near unauthorized border crossing points.80 
Each UAC has a personal story, and for those old enough to decide 
to travel to the United States, they have their own reasons for coming.  
Those who study UACs describe both push factors and pull factors.81  
Push factors are reasons in the country of origin that encourage an 
individual to leave.82  These factors may include a history of 
victimization and violence as well as poverty.83  Conversely, pull 
factors are reasons in the United States that may encourage the journey 
to this country, including the desire to reunify with family members 
already resident in the United States or the promise of educational and 
work opportunities.84  While it is impossible and dangerously 
irresponsible to look for the reason UACs are arriving to the United 
States, it is important to see what may be driving changing trends.85  
                                                          
79. Although noncitizen children may be arriving to the United States in large 
numbers, those who are not transferred to the agency are not counted because in the 
absence of indicators of human trafficking and expressed fear of return, they are 
quickly repatriated. See TVPRA 2008 § 235(a)(2). 
80. See TOTAL MONTHLY UAC APPREHENSIONS, supra note 4 (noting 
thousands of UACs apprehended at the southwest border but dozens at the coastal and 
northern borders). 
81. KANDEL, supra note 74, at 1. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. See FRANK DE WAEGH, JESUIT CONFERENCE OF CANADA AND THE UNITED 
STATES, UNWILLING PARTICIPANTS: THE COERCION OF YOUTH INTO VIOLENT 
CRIMINAL GROUPS IN CENTRAL AMERICA’S NORTHERN TRIANGLE 9 (2015) (“The 
type of migration patterns currently occurring from the Northern Triangle resemble 
displacement and migration typical of open conflicts, and as such illustrate the gravity 
16
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Given that consistently over 80% of UACs have been nationals of three 
countries in particular—El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—and 
that there was a monumental increase in the number of UACs arriving 
from all of these countries at the same time, the shared stories of these 
UACs in particular provides valuable insight.86 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees did a 
qualitative study of children fleeing these three countries (as well as 
from Mexico).87  Children were interviewed about life in their countries 
of origin and their reasons for fleeing.88  The resulting publication is 
instructive and compelling, beginning with its very name: Children on 
the Run.  While children reported varied (and often multiple) reasons 
for fleeing, “[t]wo overarching patterns of harm related to potential 
international protection needs emerged: violence by organized armed 
criminal actors and violence in the home.”89  In other words, while 
many of the children also wished to reunify with family members in the 
United States or benefit from increased educational and work 
opportunities, the majority were in fact fleeing their home countries.90  
Other reports published by on-the-ground, non-governmental 
organizations and think tanks confirm this reality.91  These reports 
confirm a near or complete breakdown of the state and the lawful 
authority in these countries as well as a regularity of and impunity for 
violence in the home and in the streets.92  Central American children 
                                                          
of the phenomenon.”); SARNATA REYNOLDS, REFUGEES INT’L, “IT’S A SUICIDE ACT 
TO LEAVE OR STAY”: INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN EL SALVADOR 4-5 (2015) 
(“massive numbers of Salvadoran youth and adults do not make the choice to leave 
their homes but are instead forced out”). 
86. See DE WAEGH, supra note 85, at 9 (“Beginning in 2011, the U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP) recorded a dramatic increase in the number of children 
migrating without their parents or guardians and crossing into the United States from 
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.”); see also REYNOLDS, supra note 85 and 
accompanying text. 
87. See Children on the Run, supra note 4. 
88. Id. at 18-20. 
89. Id. at 6. 
90. Id. at 6-7, 23-29. 
91. See DE WAEGH, supra note 85, at 9 (“In the Northern Triangle context, 
forced migration must be understood as a last recourse to the threats and violence 
exerted by maras.”); REYNOLDS, supra note 85, at 4-5. 
92. See DE WAEGH, supra note 85, at 2 (“Weak state institutions struggle to limit 
the power criminal groups exercise . . . and are often compromised by internal 
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who have fled their home countries and arrived to the United States and 
been classified as UACs have consistently reported being the victims of 
domestic violence and/or gang violence.93  As they sought refuge in the 
United States, this has most often been the basis upon which UACs have 
applied for permission to remain in the United States. 
While UACs continue to arrive from all over the world, these 
Central American children were and are the primary group of children 
that the government, the media, and academics are referring to amid 
current analysis of the UAC issue.94  These are the children that 
comprised the “surge” that the Obama administration called a 
humanitarian crisis and scrambled to house in sufficient and appropriate 
facilities.95  And these are the children who have been called gang 
members, drug mules, and terrorists during the Trump administration.96 
IV.  SPECIFIC PROTECTIONS AND LEGAL REMEDIES FOR UACS AND 
THEIR RECENT LIMITATIONS 
The mere fact of being classified as—or meeting the definition of—
a UAC does not grant the child any legal immigration status in the 
United States.  On the contrary, each year thousands of UACs are 
ordered deported from the United States by immigration judges.97  
However, being a UAC does give the child special protections and 
special access to immigration remedies that are not available to other 
noncitizens, whether adults or accompanied children.98  The most 
                                                          
corruption or outright complicity with illicit actors.”); REYNOLDS, supra note 85, at 5 
(“[T]he constant insecurity experienced by so many in El Salvador is a direct 
demonstration of the state’s unwillingness and/or inability to protect some of its 
citizens from torture and persecution.”). 
93. Children on the Run, supra note 4, at 31-39. 
94. See, e.g., KANDEL, supra note 74, at 2. 
95. Id. at 1 (“Some Members of Congress as well as the Obama Administration 
have characterized the issue as a humanitarian crisis.”); see also Hull, supra note 3. 
96. See Kim, supra note 3. 
97. See, e.g., STATISTICS YEARBOOK, supra note 33, at 14 figs.7 & 8 (showing 
that orders of removal far outpace grants of immigration relief); see also KANDEL, 
supra note 74, at 12. 
98. See, e.g., TVPRA 2008 § 235(d), Pub. L. 110-457, tit. II, 122 Stat. 5077 
(2008) (establishing “permanent” protections for certain children, including primarily 
UACs). 
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important of these protections, and their recent modifications, will be 
addressed below. 
A.  Release from Federal Detention 
The legal process to deport noncitizens from the United States 
occurs through civil proceedings.  Regardless of the reason the 
government seeks to deport a noncitizen—even if the reason is the 
noncitizen’s criminal history—the decision to deport the individual is a 
civil determination, not a criminal penalty.99  The law generally 
allows—and in some instances requires—that the noncitizen will be 
detained in civil detention during the course of those proceedings.100 
The Department of Homeland Security—acting as arresting officer, 
jailer, and prosecutor—has broad discretion over whether a noncitizen 
is detained during removal proceedings before an immigration judge.101  
It is almost always within the department’s discretion to decide whether 
a noncitizen should be detained.102  If a noncitizen is detained, the 
individual may have a right to challenge that determination and seek to 
be released upon posting bond.103  But in certain situations, including 
in the case of a noncitizen asylum seeker who lawfully seeks admission 
to the United States at a port of entry to seek protection, the noncitizen 
currently has no right to challenge the department’s custody 
determination.104  That asylum seeker may be required to spend months 
or years in civil detention while fighting for asylum.105 
The Flores Settlement solidified the concept that this process 
should not apply to immigrant children.106  It implemented a 
presumption that children should be held in the least restrictive setting 
                                                          
99. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984). 
100. INA §§ 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), 236(a), (c), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (Westlaw 2019)). 
101. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 (2019). 
102. Id. 
103. INA § 236(a). 
104. Id. § 235(b)(1)(A)(i); cf. Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1089-90 
(9th Cir. 2015), vacated and remanded to Jennings v. Rodríguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 
(2018). 
105. See Rodriguez, 804 F.3d at 1089-90; see also sources cited supra note 23. 
106. Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 7. 
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that ensures the safety of both the child and the community.107  This 
process and presumption was codified by both the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002 and the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act 
of 2008.108  Further, the child shall be released to the care of a sponsor—
a family member residing in the United States, a non-relative 
responsible adult, or even a community organization—when it is 
determined that the sponsor will provide proper care for the child.109 
There are some very important details about this process.  If the 
government decides to detain the child in a secure facility, that decision 
must be justified and reviewed every thirty days.110  Release from 
government custody does not grant the child status to remain in the 
United States.111  On the contrary, the child will remain in active 
removal proceedings that may eventually result in an order of 
deportation.112  The child need not post bond in order to be released 
from custody, but the child’s sponsor is required to provide adequate 
assurances that the child will appear for court hearings.113  The 
consequence for failing to appear—an immediate order of deportation 
in absentia—applies to UACs just as it does to adults and accompanied 
children.114  UACs may not be released on their own recognizance.115  
If a UAC turns eighteen while in government custody, the law mandates 
the child be considered for release from government custody, rather 
than immediately be detained with other adult immigrant detainees.116 
To fulfill this judicial and statutory framework, the Department of 
Health and Human Services has contracted with a network of private 
                                                          
107. Id. 
108. HSA 2002 § 462(b)(1)(C), (b)(2), Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002); 
TVPRA 2008 § 235(c)(1)-(3), Pub. L. 110-457, tit. II, 122 Stat. 5077 (2008). 
109. See TVPRA 2008 § 235(c)(2)-(3); see also Stipulated Settlement 
Agreement, supra note 2, at 10. 
110. TVPRA 2008 § 235(c)(2). 
111. Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 7 (release of UAC 
contingent upon assurances of appearing for removal proceedings); TVPRA 2008 § 
235(c)(2) (“risk of flight” is a factor in determining suitability of sponsor for release). 
112. TVPRA 2008 § 235(a)(5)(D). 
113. HSA 2002 § 462(b)(2)(A)(i); TVPRA 2008 § 235(f)(2)(B). 
114. INA § 240(b)(5)(A), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8 U.S.C. (Westlaw 2019)).  
115. HSA 2002 § 462(b)(2)(B). 
116. 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(B) (2018). 
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agencies to provide care for these children.117  While private, for-profit 
corporations often perform contracted services for adult immigrant 
detention, not-for-profit agencies that focus on child welfare are the 
primary (though not exclusive) providers of care and custody for 
detained UACs.118  The vast majority of UACs are housed in facilities 
labeled “shelters”; while these children are not quite free to leave, they 
are not in jail cells or shackled.119  Being cared for in a shelter means a 
determination has been made that the child does not present a risk to 
themselves or others and will be detained only until a suitable sponsor 
has been identified and vetted.120 
The government and its contractors are required to begin searching 
for an appropriate sponsor the moment a UAC is placed in custody.121  
There is a hierarchy of potential sponsors: parents; other close adult 
relatives, including siblings, aunts and uncles, grandparents, cousins; 
unrelated adults, including family friends; and community 
organizations.122  Sponsors must demonstrate they will provide a safe 
home for the child, however, sponsors are not required to demonstrate 
they have lawful immigration status in the United States.123  Over the 
last several years, a large portion of the UACs in government custody 
had parents living in the United States who willingly accepted their 
children into their homes.124 
                                                          
117. See, e.g., Kim Barker, Nicholas Kulish, & Rebecca R. Ruiz, He’s Built an 
Empire, with Detained Migrant Children as the Bricks, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/02/us/southwest-key-migrant-children.html. 
118. See id.; see generally Livia Luan, Profiting from Enforcement: The Role of 
Private Prisons in U.S. Immigration Detention, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (May 2, 
2018), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/profiting-enforcement-role-private-
prisons-us-immigration-detention. 
119. See KANDEL, supra note 74, at 8 n.45. 
120. See id. 
121. See id. at 8 (“The same care providers also facilitate the release of UAC to 
family members or other sponsors who are able to care for them.”); see also Stipulated 
Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 9-10 (general policy favoring release). 
122. Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 10. 
123. OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. 
SERV., CHILDREN ENTERING THE UNITED STATES UNACCOMPANIED § 2.6 (Jan. 30, 
2015) [hereinafter CHILDREN ENTERING THE UNITED STATES UNACCOMPANIED] 
(“ORR does not disqualify potential sponsors on the basis of their immigration 
status.”). 
124. See KANDEL, supra note 74, at 10 n.51. 
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Although lawful immigration status is not a requirement for 
sponsoring a UAC, in choosing to sponsor a child out of federal custody 
the sponsor must still provide crucial personal information to the 
government, including name, address, and telephone number.125  In 
some cases, the sponsor must agree to a home study, background check, 
and ongoing supervision after the child is released.126 
In 2011, the Department of Homeland Security released several 
memoranda specifying the government’s priorities for immigration 
enforcement.127  The government focused its enforcement operations 
on noncitizens who, in addition to lacking lawful immigration status, 
had a criminal history or otherwise presented a threat to the 
community.128  Immigration officers and prosecutors were granted 
discretion to not seek removal of noncitizens who lacked lawful 
immigration status but were otherwise law-abiding members of the 
community with positive equities.129  The government shifted its stance 
in 2017, declaring that while it would continue to prioritize the 
deportation of noncitizens with criminal histories, now any noncitizen 
without lawful immigration status would not be immune from adverse 
immigration enforcement activities.130  As such, it suddenly became 
much more risky for a noncitizen without lawful immigration status to 
provide their personal information to the government and serve as a 
sponsor for a UAC. 
At least two additional policy changes directly disincentivized 
sponsoring a UAC.  Health and Human Services announced it entered 
into an information sharing agreement with Homeland Security; the 
information collected during the vetting process of a potential sponsor 
                                                          
125. Id. at 9; see CHILDREN ENTERING THE UNITED STATES UNACCOMPANIED, 
supra note 123, § 2.5.1 (noting that immigration status checks are run on sponsors 
through the Department of Homeland Security). 
126. TVPRA 2008 § 235(c)(3)(B), Pub. L. 110-457, tit. II, 122 Stat. 5077 
(2008). 
127. Memorandum from John Morton, Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, to All ICE Employees (Mar. 2, 2011), 
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/civil-imm-enforcement-
priorities_app-detn-reml-aliens.pdf (regarding Civil Immigration Enforcement: 
Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens).  
128. See id. 
129. Id. 
130. See Exec. Order, No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017) 
(“Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States”). 
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would now be available to the immigration enforcement authority.131  
Contemporaneously, Health and Human Services “imposed expanded 
fingerprinting requirements to cover all sponsors and their household 
members.”132  Again, this meant the government collected even more 
personal information from the sponsors.  Reports of immigration agents 
targeting UAC sponsors soon began to appear. 
The Trump administration retracted the expanded fingerprinting 
policy after it prompted advocacy and at least one lawsuit.133  Following 
these policy changes, there was a significant increase in the length of 
time the average UAC remained in government custody.134  It is 
reasonable to assume that the longer average time in care meant either 
fewer sponsors were willing to come forward or a reticence to provide 
the required information to the government.  As noted below, detention 
fatigue might also mean more children abandoning their claims for 
protection and requesting repatriation. 
B.  Limiting UACs’ Eligibility for Asylum 
While asylum is an ancient concept, its current legal structure was 
designed by the international community in 1951 with the adoption of 
the United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees.135  In 1980, 
the United States incorporated the new international definition of a 
                                                          
131. OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERV., U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC’Y., & U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PATROL, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT (Apr. 13, 2018) (regarding Consultation and 
Information Sharing in Unaccompanied Alien Child Matters). 
132. See Class Complaint and Petition for Habeas Corpus at 8, Duchitanga v. 
Lloyd, No. 1:18-cv-10332 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 6, 2018). 
133. See Jason Grant, Trump Administration Changes Fingerprint Check Policy 
for Immigration Sponsors, N.Y. L.J., (Dec. 19, 2018). 
134. Compare FACTS AND DATA, supra note 4 (showing current average time a 
UAC is in care is sixty days), with KANDEL, supra note 74, at 10 (noting that by 
January 2016, average time in care had dropped to thirty-four days). See Class 
Complaint and Petition for Habeas Corpus, supra note 132, at 9 (“The recent changes 
in fingerprint policies have dramatically increased how long children must wait for 
release.”).  
135. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 
1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137. 
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refugee into domestic immigration law.136  That definition is the basis 
upon which a noncitizen may be accepted for resettlement in the United 
States as a refugee or may seek asylum in the United States upon 
arrival.137  Children, just like adults, may seek asylum, but UACs have 
special access to this status. 
Federal law provides preferential treatment for UACs when they 
choose to apply for asylum.  Unlike other noncitizens subject to 
deportation, including accompanied children—who may only apply for 
asylum in adversarial quasi-judicial proceedings before an immigration 
judge—UACs are given an initial opportunity to make their case for 
asylum in a non-adversarial, non-judicial setting, a process intuitively 
preferable for traumatized, fleeing children.138  Federal law also 
exempts UACs from the strict requirement that an asylum application 
be filed within one year of arrival to the United States and from the 
requirement that an asylum applicant first seek asylum in certain other 
countries.139  Since 2013, the Obama administration allowed these 
benefits to flow to UACs relatively generously.140  By contrast, several 
Trump administration officials have declared these opportunities 
should be strictly limited.141  Moreover, the Attorney General’s recent 
unilateral decision to restrict immigration judges’ authority to grant 
asylum on substantive grounds severely limited UACs’ ability to access 
asylum protection in the United States.142 
                                                          
136. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (Mar. 17, 1980). 
137. See INA § 208(b)(1)(A), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (Westlaw 2019)) (defining asylum eligibility by cross-
referencing INA § 101(a)(42)(A) (definition of refugee)). 
138. INA § 208(b)(3)(C); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.9(b), 208.14(c) (2019). 
139. INA § 208(a)(2)(E). 
140. See Memorandum from Ted Kim, Acting Chief, Asylum Division, U.S. 
Citizen and Immigration Services, to All Asylum Office Staff 2 (May 28, 2013) 
[hereinafter Kim Memo 2013] (directing that the asylum office will accept a prior 
determination by CBP or ICE that an applicant is an unaccompanied alien child and 
will assume jurisdiction). 
141. See Memorandum from Jean King, General Counsel, Exec. Office for 
Immigration Review, to James R. McHenry III, Acting Director, Exec. Office for 
Immigration Review 9 (Sept. 19, 2017) [hereinafter King Memo 2017] (Legal 
Opinion re: EOIR’s Authority to Interpret the Term Unaccompanied Alien Child for 
Purposes of Applying Certain Provisions of the TVPRA); see also, e.g., Matter of 
Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 271, 278-79 n.4 (A.G. 2018).  
142. See Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. 405 (A.G. 2018). 
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1.  Statutory Asylum Protections for UACs 
Congress recognized that UACs require special protections when 
applying for asylum.  Accordingly, it legislated: 
Applications for asylum and other forms of relief from removal in 
which an unaccompanied alien child is the principal applicant shall 
be governed by regulations which take into account the specialized 
needs of unaccompanied alien children and which address both 
procedural and substantive aspects of handling unaccompanied alien 
children’s cases.143 
While Congress gave federal agencies discretion in the rulemaking 
process to develop such regulations, some considerations were so 
important that Congress incorporated them into the law.144 
a.  Initial Jurisdiction over UACs’ Asylum Applications 
In the United States, there are generally two ways to apply for 
asylum, which are commonly referred to as affirmative and defensive 
applications.  A noncitizen present in the United States—with or 
without lawful immigration status and not currently defending against 
deportation—may affirmatively apply for asylum.145  An affirmative 
asylum application is adjudicated by an asylum officer through a 
private, informal, and non-adversarial interview.146  If the officer grants 
asylum, there is no appeal, and the new asylee is on a path to lawful 
permanent residence and eventual citizenship.147  If the officer declines 
to grant asylum, in most situations the officer will institute removal 
proceedings against the noncitizen applicant, thereby requiring the 
applicant to appear before an immigration judge to defend against 
deportation.148  The noncitizen will then have the opportunity to renew 
the application for asylum before the immigration judge for de novo 
                                                          
143. TVPRA 2008 § 235(d)(8), Pub. L. 110-457, tit. II, 122 Stat. 5077 (2008). 
144. See generally id. § 235(d)(7). 
145. INA § 208, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 8 U.S.C. (Westlaw 2019)). 
146. 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(b) (2019). 
147. Id. §§ 208.14(b), 209.2(a). 
148. Id. § 208.14(c)(1). 
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consideration, albeit in a formal, adversarial, administrative trial.149  
From the judge’s decision, an appeal may be taken to the administrative 
appellate body—the Board of Immigration Appeals—and possibly to 
the corresponding federal circuit court for further review.150  The risk 
of affirmatively applying for asylum is great because if unsuccessful, 
the applicant will have to defend against deportation.  But, in doing so, 
the applicant gets two opportunities—first affirmatively, then 
defensively—to seek asylum with the first instance being conducted in 
a less intimidating environment more suitable for a survivor of 
persecution or torture. 
A noncitizen who is already defending against deportation does not 
have this first opportunity to seek asylum affirmatively with an asylum 
officer.  Rather, once the noncitizen is apprehended and removal 
proceedings are commenced, the only opportunity to seek asylum will 
be in a defensive posture before the immigration judge.151  Therefore, 
these asylum applicants are limited to one opportunity to request 
asylum, which is only done in the adversarial, trial-court setting.  If a 
noncitizen who is already in removal proceedings tries to apply for 
asylum with the asylum officer, the officer will generally lack 
jurisdiction over the application.152 
There is an inherent great benefit to being able to seek asylum 
through the affirmative (and then, if necessary, defensive) process.  
Most UACs, however, are apprehended upon or soon after entry to the 
United States and would never have such an opportunity.  Recognizing 
the value of the affirmative process, especially for exceptionally 
vulnerable applicants such as UACs, Congress mandated that UACs get 
the benefit of this initial opportunity to seek asylum notwithstanding 
prior initiation of removal proceedings.153  The Trafficking Victims 
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 provided, “An asylum 
officer . . . shall have initial jurisdiction over any asylum application 
                                                          
149. See id.; Id. § 1240.10. 
150. Id. §§ 1240.15, 1003.1(b)(3); INA § 242(a)(2)(B) (generally denying 
judicial jurisdiction to review immigration decisions but maintain judicial jurisdiction 
over asylum denials).  
151. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.2(b), 1208.2(b). 
152. See sources cited supra note 151. 
153. INA § 208(b)(3)(C). 
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filed by [a UAC].”154  In other words, all UAC asylum applicants get 
two bites at the apple.  While the immigration judge may continue to 
schedule hearings, the plain language of the act suggests that the judge 
must take no action on an asylum application unless and until the 
asylum officer has exercised initial adjudicatory responsibility. 
While the statutory provision makes clear that jurisdiction vests 
when the asylum application is filed, it does not answer the question of 
when UAC status is determined.  It is plausible to presume that UAC 
status is determined at the time of the filing of the application, but this 
is perhaps the narrowest reading of the statute.  It is also plausible to 
presume that UAC status is determined upon apprehension or even 
upon entry to the United States.  From 2008 until 2013, the approach to 
this interpretation was unclear.  Then, in 2013, an administrative 
directive was issued: in general, the UAC status determination made at 
the time of first contact with the immigration authorities controls.155  
The directive ordered asylum officers to continue to treat the asylum 
applicant as a UAC if the asylum applicant had previously been found 
by an immigration officer to be a UAC and that determination had not 
been rescinded.156  On the other hand, if the applicant had not 
previously come into contact with an immigration officer, the asylum 
officer must consider the details of the child’s life at the time the asylum 
application was filed.157  This allowed UACs to continue to benefit 
from the initial jurisdiction provision of the statute.  The directive was 
to be followed even if a UAC had turned eighteen or had been released 
from government custody to a parent or legal guardian before an asylum 
application was filed.  Accordingly, the asylum officer would continue 
to have jurisdiction to adjudicate the application on the merits based on 
the individual having been classified as a UAC at the time of 
apprehension.158 
In 2018, while this directive was still in effect, the general counsel 
of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (the administrative 
agency within the Department of Justice that houses both the 
                                                          
154. TVPRA 2008 § 235(d)(7)(B), Pub. L. 110-457, tit. II, 122 Stat. 5077 
(2008) (emphasis added). 
155. Kim Memo 2013, supra note 140, at 2. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 2-3. 
158. See id. at 2. 
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immigration courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals) sent a 
memorandum to that agency’s director regarding UAC status 
determinations.159  The memorandum argued that immigration judges 
should determine whether a noncitizen appearing before them meets the 
definition of a UAC at that moment and determine, accordingly, 
whether the court should adjudicate any application for asylum in the 
first instance rather than allowing the asylum officer an initial 
opportunity to adjudicate the case.160 
Several months later, Attorney General Sessions exercised a power 
vested in him as the ultimate administrative interpreter of immigration 
law.161  Since all administrative authority exercised by immigration 
judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals is technically authority 
delegated to them by the Attorney General, the Attorney General may 
certify any pending immigration case to himself to review and issue a 
precedential decision binding on the immigration courts and the Board 
of Immigration Appeals (as well as on asylum officers and other 
immigration adjudicators within the Department of Homeland 
Security).162  This first decision issued by Attorney General Sessions in 
the exercise of this authority will be discussed further below.  
Importantly, though, he included a footnote that referenced his clear 
opinion that UAC status is not static.  He suggested, without deciding, 
that a (former) UAC loses such status (and the attendant protections) 
upon reaching age eighteen (and perhaps upon release from government 
custody to a sponsor).163 
                                                          
159. See King Memo 2017, supra note 140. 
160. Id. at 3-6. 
161. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1) (2019). 
162. Id. § 1003.1(g)(1); see also INA § 103(a)(1), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (Westlaw 2019)) (“determination and 
ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all questions of law shall be 
controlling”). These decisions are binding on asylum officers and other immigration 
adjudicators within the Department of Homeland Security as well. Id.  
163. Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 271, 279 n.4 (A.G. 2018). The 
Attorney General makes a vague reference to whether the UAC in that case ceased to 
be a UAC upon release from government custody to his brother-in-law. Id.  While this 
speculative comment lacks sufficient evidentiary detail for evaluation, it appears the 
Attorney General has failed to consider the plain language of contrary federal law. 
See TVPRA 2008 § 235(d)(5), Pub. L. 110-457, tit. II, 122 Stat. 5077 (2008) (“A 
department or agency of a State, or an individual or entity appointed by a State court 
or juvenile court located in the United States, acting in loco parentis, shall not be 
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Not long thereafter, the Board of Immigration Appeals—by 
definition, subordinate and beholden to the Attorney General—issued a 
precedential opinion directly on point.164  In Matter of M-A-C-O-, it 
considered the case of a young noncitizen who clearly had been a UAC 
but turned eighteen prior to filing his asylum application with the 
asylum officer.165  The Board of Immigration Appeals held the 
immigration judge properly found that jurisdiction over any asylum 
application rested only with the immigration court.166  While no 
precedential decision has yet held that a UAC released to a parent is 
also limited to seeking asylum before an immigration judge, such a 
holding is presumably within the realm of possibility. 
Then, in May 2019, a new administrative directive was issued to 
asylum officers.  This memorandum, rescinding the 2013 directive, 
instructed asylum officers to consider whether the asylum applicant was 
a UAC at the time of filing the application.167  If the child did not meet 
all criteria for being a UAC at the time the application was filed—
regardless of prior UAC status—the asylum officer would lack 
jurisdiction.168  Litigation followed quickly, and the government is 
currently enjoined from applying the new directive.169 
Although the last directive is currently stayed, those administration 
officials nonetheless wiped away five years of otherwise settled 
processing of UAC asylum applications.  The effects of these decisions 
are devastating.  Many young noncitizens will not only be limited to 
one opportunity to seek asylum but more crucially will have to tell their 
stories of fear, persecution, and torture in open court subject to cross-
examination by both an immigration prosecutor and an immigration 
                                                          
considered a legal guardian for purposes of this section or section 462 of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 279).”). 
164. 8 C.F.R 1003.1(a)(1) (“There shall be . . . a Board of Immigration 
Appeals . . . appointed by the Attorney General to act as the Attorney General’s 
delegates in the cases that come before them.”). 
165. Matter of M-A-C-O-, 27 I&N Dec. 477, 477 (BIA 2018). 
166. Id. at 479. 
167. Memorandum from John Lafferty, Chief, Asylum Division, to All Asylum 
Office Staff 1 (May 31, 2019) (regarding Updated Procedures for Asylum 
Applications filed by Unaccompanied Alien Children). 
168. Id. 
169. Order at 1, J.O.P. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, No. 8:19-cv-01944-
GJH (D. Md. Aug. 2, 2019). 
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judge rather than within a non-adversarial interview.170  Presumably, 
Congress had reasons to allow such children to seek asylum in the first 
instance before asylum officers.  Many of these young people, without 
the benefit of the protections Congress intended them to have, will be 
unable to adequately express themselves and receive the protections the 
law has afforded them. 
b.  Exemption from the Statutory Deadline 
Congress tempered the international definition of asylum by adding 
a strict filing deadline: an asylum applicant must file the application 
within one year of their last arrival to the United States.171  While there 
are some very limited exceptions, failure to timely file the application 
generally renders the noncitizen statutorily ineligible for asylum.172  
Simply not being aware of the filing deadline is not an excuse.173  
Noncitizens who miss the statutory deadline may still seek protection 
from deportation if they are more likely than not to be persecuted or 
tortured upon deportation, but those protections are greatly limited.174  
While a noncitizen granted asylum is on a path to permanent residence 
and eventual citizenship and may immigrate their spouse and children, 
a noncitizen who misses the filing deadline but proves they will be 
persecuted or tortured is likely to only have their deportation withheld 
or deferred.175  These individuals will never receive permanent 
                                                          
170. Compare INA § 240(b)(1), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (Westlaw 2019)) (allowing the immigration judge to 
“interrogate, examine, and cross-examine” the noncitizen), and 8 C.F.R. § 1240.2(a) 
(2019) (empowering government counsel to conduct “interrogation, examination, and 
cross-examination” of the noncitizen), with 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(b) (“The asylum officer 
shall conduct the interview in a non-adversarial manner.”). 
171. INA § 208(a)(2)(B). 
172. See id.; 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.4(a), 1208.4(a). 
173. Cf. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.4(a) (defining “extraordinary circumstances” and 
“changed circumstances”), 1208.4(a) (similarly defining “extraordinary 
circumstances” and “changed circumstances”). 
174. See INA § 241(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16. 
175. Compare INA § 241(b)(3) and 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16, with 8 C.F.R. § 209.2(a) 
(allowing noncitizen granted asylum to seek lawful permanent residence). 
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residence or citizenship and will never be able to immigrate their spouse 
and children.176  In other words, meeting the filing deadline is crucial. 
Congress realized failure to comply with the statutory filing 
deadline carried extremely harsh consequences for vulnerable UACs.  
Accordingly, in 2008, Congress exempted UACs from the statutory 
filing deadline.177  UACs do not, as the regulations falsely suggest, need 
to prove that their unaccompanied minor status should constitute an 
exception to the filing deadline because they need not prove a fact-
specific exception.178  Rather, the deadline simply does not apply.179  
This makes intuitive sense.  To expect children, including children of 
very tender age, who are without the protection of a parent or legal 
guardian to not only know that they must apply for asylum but to 
successfully do so within one year of arrival to the United States would 
be absurd. 
To that end, ever since asylum officers received guidance in 2013 
as to UACs, the officers did not need to consider the date of filing as 
long as the child had previously been classified as a UAC by another 
immigration official.180  The decisions and memoranda discussed above 
suggest that UAC classification is not static.  This means when a former 
UAC is no longer a UAC, the one-year filing deadline will 
automatically apply.181  If this is the case, noncitizen young people 
might find themselves having lost the opportunity to apply for asylum 
altogether.  Congress did not legislate that being a UAC tolls the one-
year filing deadline but simply said that the one-year filing deadline 
does not apply to UACs.182  As such, there is no clarity as to how the 
one-year filing deadline should be applied to a former UAC.  It is not 
clear that Congress even conceptualized the idea of a former UAC. 
                                                          
176. Cf. INA § 208(b)(3)(A) (allowing asylum status for spouse and children of 
noncitizen granted asylum); 8 C.F.R. § 208.21(a) (similarly allowing asylum status 
for spouse and children of noncitizen granted asylum). 
177. TVPRA 2008 § 235(d)(7)(A), Pub. L. 110-457, tit. II, 122 Stat. 5077 
(2008). 
178. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.4(a)(5)(ii), 1208.4(a)(5)(ii); INA § 208(a)(2)(E). 
179. INA § 208(a)(2)(E). 
180. Kim Memo 2013, supra note 140, at 2-3. 
181. King Memo 2017, supra note 141, at 8. 
182. Cf. id. (proffering tolling to prevent mooting asylum eligibility for former 
UACs). 
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Here, hypothetical situations are illustrative.  Imagine a seventeen-
and-a-half-year-old UAC and a sixteen-and-a-half-year-old UAC who 
both arrive to the United States.  Each marvelously becomes a fully 
competent adult on their eighteenth birthday and, the next day, files 
their asylum application.  If they are still considered UACs, neither has 
a problem with the one-year filing deadline because the deadline does 
not apply to UACs.  However, if on their eighteenth birthday, they were 
no longer considered UACs, the older of the two children would not be 
hindered by the one-year filing deadline (they applied six months and a 
day after arrival) while the younger child would be statutorily barred 
(having applied eighteen months and a day after arrival).  The same 
would be true of a child who arrived when only three years old and 
applied days after their eighteenth birthday.  It makes intuitive sense 
that the child who arrived younger (and thus was more vulnerable as an 
even younger child without parental care) should have greater access to 
protection, not less.  It is true that both the sixteen-year-old and three-
year-old could seek an exception to the one-year filing deadline, but it 
is legally problematic to restrict such children to a possible regulatory 
exception when Congress clearly created a statutory exemption. 
Application of this provision becomes even more unreasonable if a 
UAC released to a parent is no longer a UAC.  By statute, the 
government must determine whether a receiving sponsor could provide 
a safe placement for the child and must conduct a home study when 
necessary.183  It is possible that a UAC remains in government custody 
for a year before placement is approved.  Should this happen, and 
should such a UAC be released to a parent, their statutory opportunity 
to seek asylum could expire retroactively to the period while the UAC 
was in government custody.  Although there is no prohibition on the 
child filing the asylum application while in government custody, it 
would presumably become incumbent upon the custodian—the United 
States government—to ensure the application is filed.  This seems like 
a responsibility the government would be unwilling to assume. 
These concerns could be quelled if the one-year filing deadline is 
tolled during the time a child remains a UAC, but that is not what 
Congress legislated.184  Tolling is not the same as an exemption, and 
                                                          
183. TVPRA 2008 § 235(c)(3)(B), Pub. L. 110-457, tit. II, 122 Stat. 5077 
(2008). 
184. See King Memo 2017, supra note 141, at 8. 
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there is no basis to assume Congress intended tolling.  But, if the one-
year filing deadline begins to apply to (former) UACs, many of them 
will still encounter severe consequences.  Unlike eliminating initial 
jurisdiction and adjudication by the asylum officer, this change will not 
simply shift adjudication to a different (adversarial and more 
intimidating) adjudicator.  Rather, it will completely undermine 
statutory asylum eligibility before any adjudicator.  As a result, 
minors—who in nearly any other legal context would be found legally 
incompetent—will find themselves suffering the consequences of 
missing statutory deadlines to apply for asylum. 
c.  Exemption from Safe Third Country Bar 
The third specific protection Congress created for UACs applying 
for asylum also relates to a statutory bar to asylum: potential return to a 
safe third country.  By law, an asylum applicant is ineligible for asylum 
if they can be removed to a “safe” country with which the United States 
has entered into a bilateral or multilateral agreement by which that 
country will adjudicate the asylum claim.185  Just as the one-year filing 
deadline does not apply to UACs, this prohibition does not apply to 
UACs as a matter of law.186  Thus, a UAC will not be barred from 
seeking asylum in the United States simply because the United States 
has entered into agreements with other countries regarding those 
countries’ willingness to process asylum seekers transferred to them 
from the United States.  UACs losing this exemption is yet another 
factor that will statutorily limit their access to asylum. 
Until very recently, this limitation was primarily theoretical.  For 
many years, the United States had only one such bilateral agreement; 
the agreement is with Canada and it only applies to those asylum 
seekers who entered the United States from Canada (or entered Canada 
from the United States).187  However, there have been proposals 
                                                          
185. INA § 208(a)(2)(A), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8 U.S.C. (Westlaw 2019)). 
186. Id. § 208(a)(2)(E). 
187. Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of 
the United States of America for Cooperation in the Examination of Refugee Status 
Claims from Nationals of Third Countries, Canada-U.S., Dec. 5, 2002, GLOBAL 
AFFAIRS CANADA (Mar. 3, 2014), https://www.treaty-
accord.gc.ca/details.aspx?id=104943 (agreement covering third-country asylum 
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regarding adoption of such a bilateral agreement with Mexico.188  In 
January 2019, the government announced that while the United States 
had not yet signed a safe third country agreement with Mexico, adult 
asylum seekers arriving by land via Mexico would now be required to 
await their removal proceedings in Mexico.189  Although this new 
policy does not apply to UACs, it is reasonable to expect that the 
government intends to enter into a bilateral, safe third country 
agreement.  More recently, the United States has entered into bilateral 
agreements with El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras that would 
allow the United States to send asylum seekers to any of those 
countries.190  None of those agreements require the asylum seeker to 
have passed through the receiving country (as does the agreement with 
Canada) and none explicitly excludes UACs from applicability.191  If 
these agreements can be applied to (former) UACs, virtually all UACs 
would find themselves ineligible to apply for asylum in the United 
States.  Given the recent increase in the number of children fleeing 
                                                          
claims at the border). It is noteworthy, however, that the agreement as written and in 
effect exempts unaccompanied minors.  Id. art. 4. 
188. Joshua Partlow & Nick Miroff, U.S. and Mexico Discussing a Deal That 
Could Slash Migration at the Border, WASH. POST (July 10, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/us-and-mexico-discussing-a-
deal-that-could-slash-migration-at-the-border/2018/07/10/34e68f72-7ef2-11e8-a63f-
7b5d2aba7ac5_story.html. 
189. See Memorandum from Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland 
Security, to L. Francis Cissna, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv.; Kevin K. 
McAleenan, Comm’r., U.S. Customs & Border Protection; Ronald D. Vitiello, 
Deputy Dir. & Senior Official Performing the Duties of Dir., U.S. Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement 2 (Jan. 25, 2019), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0129_OPA_migrant-
protection-protocols-policy-guidance.pdf (regarding Policy Guidance for 
Implementation of Migrant Protection Protocols). 
190. See Agreement on Cooperation Regarding Examination of Protection 
Claims, U.S.-Guat., art. 3, July 26, 2019, FEDERAL REGISTER (Nov. 20, 2019), 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/11/20/2019-25288/agreement-
between-the-government-of-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-government-of-
the-republic; Agreement for Cooperation Regarding Examination of Protection 
Claims, U.S.-El Sal., art. 3, Sept. 20, 2019, FEDERAL REGISTER (Nov. 19, 2019), 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/11/19/2019-25137/implementing-
bilateral-and-multilateral-asylum-cooperative-agreements-under-the-immigration-
and; see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, FACT SHEET: DHS AGREEMENTS 
WITH GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, AND EL SALVADOR (Oct. 3, 2019). 
191. See sources cited supra note 186. 
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El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico, this proposition 
understandably raises serious concerns about its reasonableness and 
safety.192 
2.  Substantive Eligibility in Common UAC Asylum Claims 
Recent legal developments regarding the substantive eligibility for 
asylum are even more harmful to UACs seeking protection.  Asylum 
law is both strict and harsh; there is perhaps no issue within immigration 
law that is more litigated—and with more disparate judicial conclusions 
across the various federal circuits—than who qualifies for asylum and 
why. 
Noncitizens may meet the definition of a refugee and thereby 
qualify for asylum if they fear grave harm on account of their identity—
specifically their race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or 
membership in a particular social group.193  Developing as it did at the 
conclusion of the Second World War, it is not surprising that the 
international community was not focused on protecting individuals who 
feared randomized harm but rather peoples who were in specific, 
targeted danger.  Tomes of judicial decisions have been written to 
explain precisely who fits within this very narrow definition.  Notably, 
gender is not included among the grounds that give rise to asylum 
eligibility. 
Notwithstanding a straight forward comment by the Board of 
Immigration Appeals in its first instructive asylum decision back in 
1985 that gender would provide a basis for asylum, the Board of 
Immigration Appeals and immigration judges spent the following three 
decades denying asylum to noncitizens who had suffered gender-based 
harm.194  Applicant after applicant credibly testified to the horrendous 
suffering endured on account of their gender, often within the context 
                                                          
192. See, e.g., Children on the Run, supra note 4, at 37-39 (describing unique 
dangers suffered by children fleeing Mexico).  
193. INA § 101(a)(42)(A), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (Westlaw 2019)). 
194. Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985) (“The shared 
characteristic might be an innate one such as sex. . . . ”); Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 
316, 318-19 (A.G. 2018) (previously decided by the Board of Immigration Appeals 
and reviewed by the Attorney General). 
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of an abusive domestic relationship, but their cases were denied.195  The 
facts of one such denied case were so egregious that the Attorney 
General at the time vacated the denial and directed that regulations be 
promulgated to allow such cases to be granted;196 two decades later, 
those regulations remain pending.197  The United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees—the international interpreter of the 
international law upon which U.S. asylum law is formed—has found 
gender indeed fits within the protection framework.198  In line with this 
interpretation, federal circuit courts directed the Board of Immigration 
Appeals to fix its analysis and try again, but on remand such cases were 
quietly resolved without creating precedential decisions.199 
Then, in 2014, the Board of Immigration Appeals finally published 
a case, Matter of A-R-C-G-, addressing the issue directly.200  It held that 
a gender-based asylum claim arising from certain countries and cultures 
could be successful under U.S. asylum law.201  Specifically, it found 
“married Guatemalan women unable to leave the relationship” might 
be a cognizable particular social group giving rise to asylum 
protection.202  As a result, many women who had survived gender-
based harm were able to find protection.  Although the Board of 
Immigration Appeals did not publish a case relating to child abuse, its 
analysis similarly allowed children who had escaped domestic abuse to 
find safety in the United States by seeking asylum.  Considering large 
percentages of arriving UACs reported fleeing violence in their homes, 
                                                          
195. See, e.g., Matter of R-A-, 22 I&N Dec. 906, 908-09 (BIA 1999) (en banc).  
196. Id. at 906. 
197. See A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. at 318-19 (“Attorney General Reno vacated that 
decision for reconsideration in light of a proposed regulation, but no final rule ever 
issued, and the case was eventually resolved in 2009 without further consideration by 
the Board.”) (citations omitted). 
198. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection: 
Gender-Related Persecution Within the Context or Article 1A(2) of the 1951 
Convention and/or Its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, at 7, 
HCR/GIP/02/01 (May 7, 2002) (“It follows that sex can properly be within the ambit 
of the social group category, with women being a clear example of a social subset 
defined by innate and immutable characteristics, and who are frequently treated 
differently than men.”).  
199. See, e.g., Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 669 (9th Cir. 2010). 
200. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388, 388 (BIA 2014). 
201. Id. 
202. Id. at 392-95.  
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it is reasonable to assume that at least some of these children, relying 
on this precedential case law, were granted asylum.203 
Four years later, the Attorney General ended such grants of asylum.  
In 2018, using his broad authority to interpret immigration law, the 
Attorney General certified a domestic violence-based asylum case to 
himself for review.204  In a wide-ranging decision, Matter of A-B-, he 
vacated the 2014 precedential A-R-C-G- decision, which held domestic 
violence survivors might be eligible for asylum.205  He chastised the 
Board of Immigration Appeals for failing to conduct a rigorous review 
of the law and facts in that decision.206  He reiterated prior requirements 
for defining a particular social group and suggested that “unable to 
leave the relationship” was impermissibly circular.207  He challenged 
the idea that men harmed women because of their gender and 
relationship status rather than simply because they were criminals.208  
Finally, he sought to heighten the long-standing requirement for 
determining whether a non-governmental actor is a qualifying 
persecutor for the purposes of asylum claims.209  In what is arguably 
dicta, he concluded, “Generally, claims by aliens pertaining to domestic 
violence or gang violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors will 
not qualify for asylum.”210 
Not surprisingly, advocates were quick to challenge this decision.  
In fact, one federal district court has already enjoined certain 
applications of that decision.211  Nonetheless, the decision’s limiting 
effect on asylum eligibility remains.  Many UACs who fled sexual 
abuse, gender-based violence, or violence in the home—children who 
may have quickly been granted asylum between 2014 and 2018—will 
now have to fight an uphill battle.  They will likely have their cases 
denied by asylum officers and immigration judges who must follow the 
                                                          
203. Children on the Run, supra note 4, at 23-29. 
204. Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316, 317 (A.G. 2018). 
205. Id.  
206. Id. at 319. 
207. Id. at 335. 
208. Id. at 338-39. 
209. Id. at 343-44. 
210. Id. at 320. 
211. Order at 3, Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018); 
Grace, 344 F. Supp. 3d at 105. 
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precedential decision of the Attorney General, at least until a federal 
circuit court holds otherwise. 
Not all UAC asylum applicants were able to benefit from A-R-C-
G-.  On the contrary, those UACs who fled other harm—most 
prominently gang violence—continued to face difficulty in winning 
asylum.212  Precedential decisions still consistently denied asylum to 
applicants (including children) who escaped some of the most notorious 
criminal gangs in the world and who presented uncontroverted evidence 
that their home countries were basically failed states.213  Yet, there were 
some exceptions.  Some applicants prevailed because the gangs had 
come after their whole families, meaning their nuclear or extended 
families had become a cognizable particular social group eligible for 
asylum protection.214  Others could be granted asylum because they and 
other proposed group members shared immutable histories, such as 
serving as witnesses against the gangs.215  Others might have been 
targeted because their own religious convictions compelled them to 
speak out against the gangs at their own peril or because their identity 
as sexual or gender minorities made them targets for the gangs. 
For many of these asylum applicants (including children), A-B- also 
likely closed the door to asylum.  Even if some may eventually prevail 
in appeals to the federal circuit courts, many more will be denied in the 
interim.  In 2019, the Attorney General exercised his precedential 
authority again, this time to restrict access to asylum for those groups 
defined by family relationships.216  In Matter of L-E-A-, the Attorney 
General rescinded a prior decision in the same matter that found family-
defined particular social groups generally sufficient to sustain asylum 
eligibility; only the rarest of such families would qualify.217 
                                                          
212. See, e.g., Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 208, 221-22 (BIA 2014) 
(rejecting proposed social group of “former members of the Mara 18 gang in 
El Salvador who have renounced their gang membership”). 
213. Id.; see also Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227, 249-51 (BIA 2014). 
214. See, e.g., Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 40, 45 (BIA 2017) (finding that 
a family constitutes a particular social group, though finding in this case that the nexus 
element was not met); Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2015). 
215. See, e.g., Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(en banc). 
216. Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 581, 586 (A.G. 2019), overruling Matter 
of L-E-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 40 (BIA 2017). 
217. Id. 
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While A-B- and L-E-A- did not involve an asylum application 
brought by a UAC, it cannot be doubted that the Attorney General was 
thinking about UACs when he painted with such a broad brush in 
curtailing eligibility for asylum.218 
C.  Limiting UACs’ Access to Special Immigrant Juvenile Status 
In 1990, Congress added a provision to the immigration law 
allowing young people under twenty-one years old who have been 
abandoned, abused, or neglected by their parents to seek special 
immigrant status in the United States and, eventually, receive lawful 
permanent residence.219  The corresponding visas were underused for 
over two decades until, suddenly, the surge of UACs created a years-
long backlog.220  The Attorney General began attacking the idea that 
immigration judges should postpone potential deportation to allow time 
for delayed visas to be adjudicated.221  Subsequently, without any 
official announcement as to the change in policy, the immigration 
authorities reversed course and began denying this status to young 
people between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one.222  While federal 
litigation challenging these actions remains pending and at least one 
injunction is in place, this special protection for juveniles is no longer 
so easily acquired.223  Once again, if the administration is successful, 
many UACs will find themselves without lawful immigration status. 
                                                          
218. See Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316, 320 (grouping gang violence asylum 
claims with domestic violence asylum claims). 
219. Immigration Act of 1990 § 153(a), Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 
(Nov. 29, 1990). 
220. Compare BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, VISA 
BULLETIN 4 (Apr. 2016) [hereinafter APRIL 2016 VISA BULLETIN] (showing visas for 
special immigrants (employment-based category 4) as “current” (available)), with 
BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, VISA BULLETIN 4 (May 2016) 
[hereinafter MAY 2016 VISA BULLETIN] (showing visas for special immigrants 
(employment-based category 4) from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras 
backlogged to January 1, 2010). 
221. See, e.g., Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. 405, 419. 
222. See infra note 289 and accompanying text. 
223. See J.L. v. Cissna, 341 F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 
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1.  “Special” Protection for Abandoned, Abused,  
and Neglected Children 
Immigration law allows for various categories of noncitizens who 
present specific factors to be classified as “special immigrants” and to 
be granted lawful immigration status on account of such 
classification.224  One such category is for special immigrant juveniles, 
which Congress defined as unmarried noncitizens under twenty-one 
years old; present in the United States; and, who had suffered 
abandonment, abuse, or neglect by one or both of their parents and 
whose best interests are not served by return to country of origin as 
determined by a relevant state court.225  In other words, where 
appropriate, children who would be protected by the child welfare 
system may also be shielded from deportation (after the state court 
determines both that the children could not be reunified with their 
parent(s) and should not be returned to their country of origin).226 
This category of children, in its nearly three decades of existence, 
has been redefined and broadened to protect more children.227  At first, 
the law required the child to be eligible for long-term foster care due to 
abuse, abandonment, or neglect.228  However, in 2008, this provision 
was modified presumably after Congress realized it was a narrow 
definition that left many children without needed protection.229  
Accordingly, Congress legislated that it was only necessary that the 
child had been made dependent upon the state and placed under the care 
of an institution or individual and that reunification with one or both 
parents was not viable because of abuse, abandonment, neglect, or a 
similar basis under state law.230  The same legislative revision replaced 
the requirement that the Attorney General “expressly consent” to the 
                                                          
224. See generally INA § 101(a)(27), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (Westlaw 2019)). 
225. See id. § 101(a)(27)(J)(i). 
226. See id. § 101(a)(27)(J)(ii). 
227. See generally Dalia Castillo-Ramos & Yasmin Ravar, A New Legal 
Framework for Children Seeking Special Immigrant Juvenile Status, 20 RICH. PUB. 
INT. L. REV. 49, 52-56 (2017). 
228. Id. at 53; see also Immigration Act of 1990 § 153(a), Pub. L. No. 101-649, 
104 Stat. 4978 (Nov. 29, 1990). 
229. TVPRA 2008 § 235(d)(1), Pub. L. 110-457, tit. II, 122 Stat. 5077 (2008). 
230. Id. § 235(d)(1)(A). 
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grant of special immigrant juvenile status with simply the “consent” of 
the Secretary of Homeland Security.231 
From the very creation of this status, Congress recognized that the 
federal immigration authorities were not competent to determine a 
child’s welfare and best interest.  Rather, such evaluations have always 
been squarely the province of the state juvenile courts.232  So, Congress 
created a multi-step process.  First, the appropriate state court would 
need to exercise its jurisdiction over the child and find the child 
dependent on the court or make a custody order over the child.233  Then, 
(under the law’s current form) the same court would have to find that 
the child’s reunification with one or both of the child’s parents is not 
viable due to abandonment, abuse, neglect, or a similar basis under state 
law and it is not in the child’s best interest to return to their country of 
origin.234  The child could then take this order—known in the 
immigration world as the “predicate order”—and petition to be 
classified by the immigration authority as a special immigrant 
juvenile.235  Concurrently or subsequently, the new special immigrant 
juvenile could apply for lawful permanent residence in the United 
States.236 
The path to lawful permanent residence for a special immigrant 
juvenile is neither direct nor easy.  The law requires that the child 
interact with multiple adjudicators from both the state and federal 
governments; it also requires that the actions of one government be 
sufficient for the needs of the other government.  Ultimately, however, 
it is a crucial protection for these vulnerable young people and often the 
only pathway they may have to lawful immigration status in the United 
States. 
                                                          
231. Id. § 235(d)(1)(B). 
232. See Castillo-Ramos & Ravar, supra note 227, at 56. 
233. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY, POLICY MANUAL, vol. 6, pt. J, ch. 2, D1 (Feb. 6, 2019), 
https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/toc. The name of the appropriate court varies 
by state including juvenile court, dependency court, family court, probate court, and 
orphans’ court, to name a few. Id. ch. 3, A1. 
234. Id. at ch. 2, D2-D3. 
235. Id. at ch. 4, A. 
236. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY, INSTRUCTIONS FOR APPLICATION TO REGISTER PERMANENT RESIDENCE OR 
ADJUST STATUS 23 (July 15, 2019), https://www.uscis.gov/i-485.  
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2.  Reaching the Visa Cap 
A child does not have to be a UAC in order to be classified as a 
special immigrant juvenile, but based on the underlying reasons for the 
surge of UAC arrivals to the United States since 2014, many UACs 
nonetheless qualify for this protection.  In fact, the massive number of 
eligible children arriving to the United States caused the first of the 
recent factors narrowing access to this status.237 
Since the creation of modern United States immigration law in the 
early twentieth century, numerical limitations on classes of immigrants 
have been a hallmark.238  Some noncitizens, primarily the immediate 
relatives of United States citizens and asylum seekers, are granted 
lawful status in the United States without numeric limitations.239  
Nearly every other category of noncitizen seeking permanent 
immigration status in the United States—more distant relatives of 
citizens as well as all relatives of lawful permanent residents, workers 
and professionals seeking employment-based visas, and refugees—is 
limited by numerical caps.240  In general, these caps work in two ways: 
they limit the total number of noncitizens who may enter the United 
States with a certain type of visa, and they prevent immigrants from any 
one country from receiving too high a percentage of each visa type.241 
Each year, only a limited number of visas may be given out, which 
may be further limited based on the immigrant’s country of origin.  
Again, an example is helpful.  An adult citizen can petition to immigrate 
a sibling to the United States, but only so many of these visas (known 
as family-based category four) may be given out each year.242  Once the 
                                                          
237. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. The timing of the significant 
retrogression of visa availability intuitively corresponds to the time it would take for 
the surge of children that began arriving in 2014 and 2013 to wind through the state 
court system and be ready to petition for classification as special immigrant juveniles. 
238. Emergency Quota Act of 1921, Pub. L. 67-5, 42 Stat. 5 (May 19, 1921). 
239. INA § 201(b)(2)(A)(i), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (Westlaw 2019)); id. § 209(b) (not listing any limitation 
on asylees granted lawful permanent residence). 
240. Id. § 201(c)-(d). Although there is no limit to how many refugees can be 
granted permanent residence per year, Id. §201(b)(1)(B), the President establishes the 
average number of refugees to be resettled in the first instance in the United States 
each year. Id. § 207(a)(2). 
241. Id. § 202(a)(2). 
242. Id. § 203(a)(4). 
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cap is reached, the next person to apply is put in line for the next year.  
As of February 2019, the next person in line for a sibling visa filed their 
petition back on June 22, 2005.243  But more visas have been requested 
for some countries than others, so immigrants from those countries have 
to wait even longer.  As of February 2019, the next sibling in line from 
Mexico filed their petition on February 8, 1998, and the next sibling in 
line from the Philippines filed their petition on October 1, 1995.244  For 
many who want to immigrate to the United States, patience is a 
requirement. 
The immigration authority has the power to classify young 
noncitizens as special immigrant juveniles upon presenting valid 
predicate orders.  There is no limit to how many non-citizen young 
people can be classified.  But the fact of being classified as such does 
not grant the noncitizen lawful immigration status in the United States, 
even though this classification is commonly referred to as “special 
immigrant juvenile status.”  Rather, being so classified makes the 
young noncitizen eligible to apply for lawful permanent residence, that 
is, an immigrant visa.  These visas, too, are subject to numerical caps 
and the per-country limitations. 
Fortunately for these vulnerable juveniles (and for humanity), this 
category has so far been undersubscribed.  In other words, there has 
always been a visa generally available under this category for non-
citizen youth classified as special immigrant juveniles because there 
have not been enough applicants to reach the cap.245  But, while the 
total number of visas has not reached the cap, certain countries have 
reached their own percentage caps because of a high number of non-
citizen applicants from those countries.246  Since only a certain 
percentage of the visas available can be given to immigrants from any 
particular country, some special immigrant juveniles had to begin 
waiting in line.247  The cap “hit” for the first time under this category in 
                                                          
243. BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, VISA BULLETIN 2 
(Feb. 2019) [hereinafter FEBRUARY 2019 VISA BULLETIN]. 
244. Id. 
245. See id. at 3-4 (for “all chargeability areas except those listed,” special 
immigrant (employment-based category 4) is “current”). 
246. See id. at 4 (listing final action date of September 1, 2017, for special 
immigrants from Mexico and March 1, 2016, for special immigrants from El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras). 
247. See, e.g., MAY 2016 VISA BULLETIN, supra note 220. 
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2016.248  Suddenly, visas could no longer be issued to special immigrant 
juveniles hailing from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Mexico.249  Not long thereafter, special immigrant juveniles from India 
also had to begin waiting for visas to become available.250 
This new backlog clearly has its roots in the significant increase in 
arrivals of UACs that began in 2014.  It is well documented that many 
of those UACs were Central Americans fleeing domestic violence and 
gang violence, and thus there is good reason to believe they would be 
able to demonstrate both that they had suffered abandonment, abuse, or 
neglect by one or both parents (domestic violence) and that it was not 
in their best interest to return to their countries of origin (because of the 
rampant gang violence).  Currently, visas for special immigrant 
juveniles from India are immediately available, which suggests the 
increase in demand was only temporary.251  The availability of visas for 
special immigrant juveniles from Mexico has fluctuated greatly.252  
However, the visas for young people from El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Honduras are currently backlogged approximately three years.253  As a 
matter of law, the immigration authority is currently simply 
unauthorized to issue visas to these children allowing them to begin 
their lawful permanent residence in the United States until their “turn” 
in the line.254 
                                                          
248. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
249. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
250. BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, VISA BULLETIN 8 
(August 2016) [hereinafter AUGUST 2016 VISA BULLETIN]. 
251. FEBRUARY 2019 VISA BULLETIN, supra note 243, at 4 (final action date is 
“current” for special immigrants (employment-based category 4) from India). 
252. Compare AUGUST 2016 VISA BULLETIN, supra note 250, at 4 (listing final 
action date of January 1, 2010), with FEBRUARY 2019 VISA BULLETIN, supra note 243, 
at 4 (listing final action date of September 1, 2017, for special immigrants from 
Mexico). 
253. FEBRUARY 2019 VISA BULLETIN, supra note 243, at 4 (listing final action 
date of March 1, 2016, for special immigrants from El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Honduras). 
254. INA § 245(a), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8 U.S.C. (Westlaw 2019)) (requiring that a visa be available in order for 
an application for adjustment of status to be granted). 
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3.  Marching Forward with Removal Proceedings 
The availability of visas for special immigrant juveniles has 
nothing to do with the Trump administration.  The cap for young people 
was “hit” for the impacted countries during the last administration, and 
the immigration authority was obligated to follow the law and delay 
issuing visas to these immigrants unless and until the visas became 
available.255  The administration does control, however, whether 
immigration judges and immigration enforcement agents are willing to 
give special immigrant juveniles the opportunity to wait their turn. 
While any non-citizen youth present in the United States who meets 
the eligibility requirements may apply for classification as a special 
immigrant juvenile, many of the applicants in recent years have been 
children who were previously apprehended by immigration officers and 
classified as UACs.  Virtually all of these children upon apprehension 
were issued a Notice to Appear, a charging document that begins formal 
administrative removal proceedings before an immigration judge.256 
During these proceedings, the immigration judge is charged with 
determining whether the UAC is subject to removal from the United 
States (most are by virtue simply of being noncitizens present without 
lawful immigration status) and, if so, whether the child is eligible for 
some relief from removal.257  If a UAC seeks asylum, initial jurisdiction 
will be vested in an asylum officer; if asylum is not granted by the 
officer, the decision is subject to a renewed de novo application with 
the immigration judge.258  But applications for special immigrant 
juvenile status are different.  The predicate findings are made by a state 
court judge, and the special immigrant classification is determined by 
the Department of Homeland Security.259  The immigration judge has 
no jurisdiction over either of these steps in the process (although the 
                                                          
255. See id.; see also supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
256. See TVPRA 2008 § 235(a)(5)(D), Pub. L. 110-457, tit. II, 122 Stat. 5077 
(2008); see also KANDEL, supra note 74, at 12 n.64. 
257. See INA § 240(a)(1), (c)(1), (c)(4). 
258. INA § 208(b)(3)(C) (vesting initial jurisdiction in the asylum office). There 
are no implementing regulations for this provision, so it is generally assumed that the 
regulations related to referred affirmative asylum applications apply. See 8 C.F.R. § 
208.9(b) (2019) (defining generally how an asylum officer must conduct an asylum 
interview). 
259. See Castillo-Ramos & Ravar, supra note 227, at 51. 
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immigration judge, in some circumstances, can adjudicate the visa 
application once special immigrant juvenile classification has been 
approved).260  Nonetheless, the immigration judge is expected to 
preside over active removal proceedings and determine whether the 
special immigrant juvenile applicant is eligible to remain in the United 
States.  Immigration judges across the country, therefore, find 
themselves charged with adjudicating the removal proceedings of 
UACs who are clearly subject to removal; who have been adjudicated 
as dependents by state court judges who concluded it is not in the 
children’s best interests to return to their countries of origin; and, who 
have been classified by the Department of Homeland Security as special 
immigrant juveniles; and yet, the child is currently without lawful 
immigration status and thus currently has no legal claim to remain in 
the United States. What is the judge to do? 
Administrative closure has been a docketing tool available to 
immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals for 
decades.261  This tool is a way to temporarily remove a case from the 
immigration judge’s active docket.262  In these situations, there is no 
final conclusion of the case; it remains under the judge’s jurisdiction, 
but it is filed away until further action is ready to be taken.263  For 
decades, administrative closure was used when the parties were not 
ready for final adjudication, such as when the parties were awaiting the 
results of a collateral matter that would fundamentally affect the 
outcome of the removal proceedings (e.g., issuance of a long-
backlogged visa).264  Administrative closure was also used when the 
immigration prosecutor exercised discretion to not seek removal of a 
removable noncitizen at a particular time.265  This tool is not unique to 
                                                          
260. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(b) (requiring that the petition for special immigrant 
juvenile classification be filed with the immigration authority). But see 8 C.F.R. § 
1245.2(a)(1) (vesting the immigration judge with jurisdiction over certain applications 
for adjustment of status). 
261. See Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688, 690 (BIA 2012) (citing Matter 
of Gutierrez, 21 I&N Dec. 479, 480 (BIA 1996)). 
262. Id. at 692; see Matter of W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. 17, 17-18 (BIA 2017). 
263. Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. at 694; see W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. at 18. 
264. See sources cited supra note 263. 
265. W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. at 17. 
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immigration judges but is an established tool in other courts as well.266  
While no law or regulation generally authorized immigration judges to 
administratively close cases, it is referenced by some regulations and is 
the subject of precedential case law.267  For many special immigrant 
juveniles for whom visas were not yet available, administrative closure 
was a very important way to delay an order of deportation until the visa 
could be issued. 
In 2018, the Attorney General, using his authority to interpret the 
immigration law and to issue precedential decisions, acted to eliminate 
administrative closure.268  The Attorney General axed administrative 
closure when he issued Matter of Castro-Tum, which involved a 
UAC.269  In Castro-Tum, the UAC failed to appear before the 
immigration judge and, rather than ordering the child removed in 
absentia, the immigration judge administratively closed proceedings, 
expressing concerns over the validity of service of notice made upon 
the UAC.270  The Department of Homeland Security appealed, and the 
Board of Immigration Appeals held that the immigration judge erred; 
he should have ordered removal.271  The Attorney General was 
apparently unsatisfied with this result.  He ordered the case to be 
certified to him and then concluded that, notwithstanding decades of 
use, there was no lawful authority for immigration judges and the Board 
of Immigration Appeals to administratively close cases.272  Thus, a tool 
that allowed immigration judges to manage crushing caseloads and to 
focus on cases that were ripe for adjudication was lost.273 
The Attorney General, however, was still not satisfied that all cases 
would expeditiously march forward.  Soon thereafter, he issued another 
                                                          
266. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 247 (3d 
Cir. 2013); Lehman v. Revolution Portfolio LLC, 166 F.3d 389, 392 (1st Cir. 1999). 
267. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.62(b)(1)(i), (2)(iii), 1240.70(f)–(h) (2019); see also 
Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. at 688; W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. at 17. 
268. Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 271, 272 (A.G. 2018) (overruling prior 
precedent and stripping immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals of 
the authority to administratively close cases). 
269. Id. 
270. Id. at 273-74. 
271. See id. at 274, 290-91. 
272. Id. at 281-94. 
273. See id. 
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precedential decision, Matter of L-A-B-R-.274  In that case, the Attorney 
General considered the authority of immigration judges to continue 
removal proceedings, specifically in the context of collateral matters 
outside the immigration judge’s control.275  While he adopted the long-
standing “good cause” standard, he cautioned, “‘Good cause,’ in other 
words, does not mean ‘no cause’ or ‘any cause.’”276  The Attorney 
General did not hide his inspiration for this conclusion nor his reasoning 
for issuing a rare precedential decision on this matter: “The overuse of 
continuances in the immigration courts is a significant and recurring 
problem.  Unjustified continuances provide an illegitimate form of de 
facto relief from removal.”277  By this holding, the Attorney General 
restricted immigration judges in granting continuances to allow the 
adjudication of immigration applications such as petitions for special 
immigrant juvenile classification with other adjudicators, even though 
those adjudications, if successful, would obviate the need for removal 
proceedings by granting the noncitizen lawful immigration status.278  
Admittedly, the cases under review in L-A-B-R- were extreme examples 
of continuances issued by immigration judges over the objections by 
the prosecuting attorneys, but the case’s conclusion is clear: noncitizens 
cannot assume they will be given time to pursue collateral remedies.279 
Neither Castro-Tum nor L-A-B-R- addressed the issue of UACs 
seeking classification as special immigrant juveniles or, thereafter, 
seeking lawful permanent residence.  Indeed, given current processing 
of these cases, limiting access would be problematic: federal law 
requires adjudication of special immigrant juvenile petitions within six 
months, yet the Department of Homeland Security is currently in 
flagrant violation of this Congressional mandate.280  However, it is not 
                                                          
274. See generally Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. 405 (A.G. 2018). 
275. Id. at 405-06. 
276. Id. at 407. 
277. Id. at 411. 
278. Id. at 419 (“I therefore conclude that an immigration judge must assess 
whether good cause supports a continuance to accommodate a collateral proceeding 
by considering primarily the likelihood that the collateral relief will be granted and 
will materially affect the outcome of the removal proceedings, and any other relevant 
secondary factors.”). 
279. Id. at 409-19. 
280. See TVPRA § 235(d)(2), Pub. L. 110-457, tit. II, 122 Stat. 5077 (2008) 
(“All applications for special immigrant status under section 101(a)(27)(J) of the 
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hard to imagine that UACs—perhaps especially older teens who are far 
back in the line for visas—will soon find themselves told by 
immigration judges that they have not established good cause to delay 
their deportation any longer.  As absurd as it may sound, a state court 
judge’s ruling that a child should not be returned to their country of 
origin and Department of Homeland Security’s classification that the 
child is a special immigrant juvenile, may not shield from deportation 
the youth whose visa remains out of reach. 
4.  Interpreting the Law to Exclude Older Teens 
The definition of “child” is important because many paths to lawful 
immigration status are based on family relationships and may allow 
family members to accompany the principal immigrant.  For most 
immigration purposes, “child” is defined broadly to include young 
unmarried people under the age of twenty-one.281  This same age cut-
off was promulgated by regulation for special immigrant juveniles.282  
Yet, now efforts are underway to restrict access to this protection for 
older youths.283 
At first, the idea of a special immigrant juvenile who is eighteen, 
nineteen, or twenty years old may be confusing.  In this country, 
eighteen is generally the age of majority.  Since special immigrant 
juvenile classification requires a predicate finding by the state juvenile 
court that the child is dependent on the state or placed under the custody 
of another, classifying such a youth as a special immigrant juvenile 
might seem impossible.  This is not the case.  Just as Congress 
recognized that young people should continue to be considered children 
until twenty-one for many purposes, some state legislatures and state 
                                                          
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J)) shall be adjudicated by the 
Secretary of Homeland Security not later than 180 days after the date on which the 
application is filed.”).  
281. INA § 101(b)(1), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8 U.S.C. (Westlaw 2019)) (defining child as under twenty-one years old 
for most immigration purposes). But see id. § 101(c)(1) (defining child differently for 
citizenship and naturalization purposes). 
282. 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(1) (2019). 
283. See, e.g., J.L. v. Cissna, 341 F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 
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courts have done the same.284  At least several states allow for a youth 
over eighteen to have the state court exercise proper jurisdiction and 
thereafter make the required predicate findings for special immigrant 
juvenile classification.285 
Many of these youths, some of whom were UACs, were able to 
benefit from the state court processes available to them and to thereafter 
be classified as special immigrant juveniles and acquire lawful 
permanent residence.  Then the immigration adjudicators began 
pushing back.  Notwithstanding the clear federal law allowing for 
classification of youth of this age, adjudicators began denying these 
applications, generally finding the underlying state court predicate 
orders were not valid for these purposes.286  Federal litigation quickly 
followed.287 
There was no change in the regulations as to who qualifies for 
special immigrant juvenile classification and how cases of older youths 
should be adjudicated.288  There was no official policy statement or 
memorandum issued publicly.  But, through federal litigation, internal 
guidance to adjudicators became public.289  While the guidance is 
carefully couched so as not to require across-the-board denial of these 
applications, the subtext is clear: these applications should generally be 
denied.290  A unitary result, however, is not possible because whether 
                                                          
284. See, e.g., Cal. Prob. Code § 1510.1 (West 2019); Md. Code Ann., Fam. 
Law § 1-201(b)(10) (West 2017); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 661(b) (McKinney 2019); see 
also Recinos v. Escobar, 473 Mass. 734, 739 (2016). 
285. See sources cited supra note 284. 
286. See J.L., 341 F. Supp. 3d at 1061; see also R.F.M. v. Nielsen, 365 F. Supp. 
3d 350, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 
287. See generally J.L., 341 F.Supp.3d at 1061; see also R.F.M., 365 F.Supp.3d 
at 360; Budhathoki v. Nielsen, 898 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 2018). 
288. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(4) (2019). In fact, it is important to note that the 
regulations have not been updated to incorporate the changes made to the law a decade 
ago by TVPRA 2008 (still referring to long-term foster care requirement). 
Budhathoki, 898 F.3d at 508 & n.4. 
289. See Certification of Administrative Record at AR0728-37, R.F.M., 365 F. 
Supp. 3d 350 (No. 18-cv-05068-JGK) (internal adjudication manual specifying basis 
for rejecting post-18 bases for special immigrant juvenile classification). 
290. See id. at AR0728 (“When a court loses the capacity to order a child’s 
reunification with a parent at age 18, they necessarily cannot make a juridical 
determination that reunification is not viable . . . . The burden is on the petitioner to 
establish eligibility. Generally, a petition should not be denied based on USCIS’ 
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classification is valid will depend entirely on the technical substantive 
and procedural law of the state that issued the predicate order in 
question.291  A federal court in Texas ruled against youths seeking this 
classification.292  Litigation is ongoing in New York as it is in 
California, where the government is currently enjoined from denying 
applications for special immigrant juvenile classification for these older 
youths.293  Attorneys and observers can only speculate how these cases 
will end. 
D.  Increased Desirability of Voluntary Departure 
As discussed above, under the Trump administration, UACs are 
less likely to be released from government custody or are at least likely 
to be detained longer; will have fewer opportunities to seek asylum and 
will have greater difficulty providing substantive eligibility; and, may 
not be given the opportunity to seek special immigrant juvenile 
classification and/or await subsequent lawful permanent residence.  
This brings an alternative solution to the surface, albeit not the one 
arriving immigrants generally desire: voluntary departure. 
At the conclusion of removal proceedings, if the immigration judge 
finds the noncitizen appearing before the court is subject to removal and 
is not eligible for a remedy from removal, the judge must order 
deportation.294  With deportation comes a ten-year bar from reentry to 
the United States, even if otherwise eligible.295  Reentry after an order 
of deportation may have even harsher consequences, including criminal 
penalties.296  But there is one important exception to deportation, 
                                                          
interpretation of state law, but rather officers should defer to the juvenile court’s 
interpretation of the relevant state laws.”). 
291. See id. at AR0732-37 (distinguishing different states’ laws). 
292. Compare, e.g., Cal. Prob. Code § 1510.1 (West 2019) (statutorily allowing 
a guardian to be appointed to a noncitizen youth between eighteen and twenty-one 
years old in conjunction with a petition for findings regarding eligibility for special 
immigrant juvenile status), with Recinos v. Escobar, 473 Mass. 734, 734 (2016). 
293. See, e.g., J.L. v. Cissna, 341 F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2018). See 
generally R.F.M. v. Nielsen, 365 F. Supp. 3d 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 
294. See Matter of S-O-G- & F-D-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 462, 465-66 (A.G. 2018). 
295. INA § 212(a)(9)(A), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8 U.S.C. (Westlaw 2019)). 
296. Id. § 276(b). 
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known as voluntary departure, which may serve as the smallest of 
consolations. 
A grant of voluntary departure allows the noncitizen to 
“voluntarily” depart the United States in lieu of deportation.297  
Substantively, the result is the same because the noncitizen must depart, 
but legally and practically there are some crucial differences.  The 
noncitizen who complies with a grant of voluntary departure will not 
have the legal bar to subsequent reentry on account of having been 
deported, which can be especially important if they hope to someday 
immigrate through a family member.298  The individual will generally 
be given a date by which to leave, thus having at least some time to 
settle their affairs.299  Most will be able to leave by ordinary commercial 
transport, not in shackles.300  For someone who wants to avoid the 
stigma of being deported, voluntary departure can be a great option. 
Certain requirements must be met, however, if individuals wish to 
be granted voluntary departure.  Unlike deportation, voluntary 
departure is achieved at the expense of the noncitizen.301  The 
noncitizen must demonstrate that they have the means and intent to 
depart and may be required to post a bond to prove that intention.302  
Voluntary departure is also unavailable to certain noncitizens, including 
some recently arrived noncitizens, noncitizens who sought entry at a 
port of entry, and noncitizens with serious criminal or terrorist 
backgrounds.303  Finally, if detained, a noncitizen granted voluntary 
departure will remain detained until voluntary departure is achieved.304 
                                                          
297. Id. § 240B(a)(1), (b)(1). 
298. Individuals granted voluntary departure who do in fact voluntarily depart 
may, however, still be barred from reentry on account of unlawful presence. Id. § 
212(a)(9)(B). 
299. Id. § 240B(a)(2)(A) (allowing up to one hundred twenty days to depart 
under certain conditions), (b)(2) (allowing up to sixty days to depart at the conclusion 
of proceedings). 
300. Id. § 240B(a)(1), (b)(1) (requiring noncitizen to purchase their own 
transportation at their own expense). 
301. See id. 
302. Id. § 240B(b)(1)(D) (requiring a showing of “clear and convincing 
evidence” that the person has the means to depart and intends to do so); (3) (requiring 
bond at the conclusion of proceedings to ensure departure). 
303. See id. § 240B(a)(1), (a)(4), (b)(1)(B)-(C), (c). 
304. 8 C.F.R. § 240.25(b) (2019). 
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Presumably recognizing some UACs may repent from their 
decision to travel to the United States or might not qualify for lawful 
immigration status and that such vulnerable children should not have 
the stigma and consequences of an order of deportation, Congress 
granted to UACs special access to voluntary departure.305  The 
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 authorized 
voluntary departure for UACs at no expense to the children.306  No other 
strings are attached.  Given the specificity of this rule, it is reasonable 
to presume almost all UACs are eligible for voluntary departure, 
notwithstanding their time and manner of entry, their history, or their 
means to depart. 
Given the issues discussed above, in the current political climate, 
many UACs will find voluntary departure to be their best option.  
Lacking a sponsor who is willing to speak for them and thus suffering 
detention fatigue and being told their prospects for substantive lawful 
immigration status have greatly diminished, many children may choose 
simply to ask permission to depart the United States.  Given the same 
or worsening conditions in countries of origin, however, UACs are 
unlikely to find the reasons for their initial departure mitigated.  
Unfortunately, many may try to repeat the harrowing journey to the 
United States and to seek more remote and dangerous entry points in 
hopes of avoiding detection. 
V.  DISINCENTIVIZING COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW AND THUS 
INCREASING VULNERABILITY 
UACs are not given a free pass to gaining immigration status in the 
United States.  Each one will have to navigate the labyrinthine system 
in hopes of finding a permanent home in the United States.307  To that 
end, Congress has specifically directed the government to ensure that 
UACs in government custody are made aware of their rights and 
responsibilities throughout the legal process.308  A network of not-for-
profit organizations and law firms endeavor to ensure these children are 
                                                          
305. TVPRA 2008 § 235(a)(5)(D)(ii), Pub. L. 110-457, tit. II, 122 Stat. 5077 
(2008). 
306. Id. 
307. See id. § 235(a)(5)(D)(i) (all UACs placed in removal proceedings). 
308. Id. § 235(c)(4)-(5). 
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well-informed and, to the extent possible, represented by legal 
counsel.309 
Once released from federal custody, it is up to the UACs and their 
sponsors to ensure compliance with the law and to find legal counsel to 
represent them throughout the process.  Competent legal counsel, 
committed to honestly explaining to their clients the possibilities for 
lawful immigration status in the United States, will find themselves 
increasingly disappointing UACs with the news that protection may no 
longer be within reach.  As the prospect for winning their cases dims, 
the incentive for complying is removed.  Their attorneys will continue 
to tell them to show up to court, to diligently prepare their applications, 
and to not work without authorization but that they should also prepare 
for the reality of having their cases denied and needing to return home; 
internal and external pressures, however, will understandably 
encourage the opposite reaction.  The American immigration story is a 
story of optimism, but as the hope for lawful immigration status 
decreases, the likelihood that UACs will rely on the legal process will 
also diminish—especially when it comes to older teens who have 
already become accustomed to making their own way in the world. 
Even for those UACs who remain faithful to the legal process, the 
narrowing of protections will make compliance more difficult.  As 
asylum and special immigrant juvenile status are less generously 
granted, these children will have to endure through the appeals process 
until, hopefully, they eventually find protection.  Status that should be 
acquired within six months may take years.310  In the meantime, many 
of these children may finish high school and find they have worn out 
their welcome at the sponsors’ homes but do not yet have work 
authorization.311  Especially for older teens who need to support 
                                                          
309. See Shain Aber & Anne Marie Mulcahy, Legal Services for 
Unaccompanied Children, VERA INST. OF JUST., https://www.vera.org/projects/legal-
services-for-unaccompanied-children (last visited Nov. 10, 2019). 
310. Cf. TVPRA 2008 § 235(d)(2) (requiring that application for special 
immigrant juvenile classification be adjudicated within 180 days). Practitioners know 
this is not occurring. 
311. Only certain classes of noncitizens are granted work authorization.  See 8 
C.F.R. § 274a.12(c) (2019). Some grants of work authorization are intentionally 
punitive.  See id. § 208.7 (delaying, perhaps indefinitely, access to employment 
authorization for any asylum seeker who creates any delay in adjudication of their 
application). 
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themselves or contribute to the household, the inability to work lawfully 
for years is likely to be hugely problematic. 
Lacking hope or just the ability to survive, these UACs are likely 
to fade into the population of noncitizens without lawful immigration 
status, working and living in conditions that make them incredibly 
vulnerable to exploitation.  It does not take much supposition to assume 
these children may soon find themselves in dangerous situations at best 
and the most horrid situations of human trafficking—slave labor and 
sex work—at worst.312 
With that, perhaps Congress’s design in the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Reauthorization Act becomes clear.  With this law, Congress 
created “permanent protection for certain at-risk children,” including 
the expanded access to both asylum and special immigrant juvenile 
status discussed above.313  Congress provided these protections to all 
UACs, not just survivors of human trafficking, because all UACs can 
find themselves on the path to this horrendous form of human 
exploitation.  Ignoring such far-sighted protections—or working 
against them—subjects children to the harm the law meant to address. 
VI.  A SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY 
Since 2014, over two hundred thousand UACs have been 
apprehended by immigration officials upon arrival to the United 
States.314  The legal outcome of these children’s cases is unclear.  While 
the Executive Office for Immigration Review reports on the percentage 
of UACs who have been ordered removed for failing to appear at their 
immigration court hearings, the substantive outcomes of the cases of 
                                                          
312. See, e.g., Abbie VanSickle, Overwhelmed Federal Officials Released 
Immigrant Teens to Traffickers in 2014, WASH. POST (Jan. 26, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/failures-in-handling-unaccompanied-
migrant-minors-have-led-to-trafficking/2016/01/26/c47de164-c138-11e5-9443-
7074c3645405_story.html; Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District 
of Ohio, Dep’t of Justice, Another Defendant Pleads Guilty in Connection with Labor 
Trafficking of Minors at Ohio Egg Farm (Sept. 18, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndoh/pr/another-defendant-pleads-guilty-connection-
labor-trafficking-minors-ohio-egg-farm. 
313. TVPRA 2008 § 235(d). 
314. See TOTAL MONTHLY UAC APPREHENSIONS, supra note 4; FACTS AND 
DATA, supra note 4.  
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those children who did appear are not so readily provided.315  
Nonetheless, given the overwhelming number of cases pending before 
the immigration courts, it is fair to assume the cases of many of the 
UACs who arrived in the last years remain pending.316 
As discussed, the last three years have seen significant efforts by 
the federal government to limit the UACs’ ability to access and to 
succeed in requesting permanent permission to remain in the United 
States—primarily in the forms of asylum and special immigrant 
juvenile classification.  Further, while immigrant children are legally 
entitled to benefit from public education, many of the UACs who have 
arrived in the last several years will by now have aged out of public 
education.317  For those whose applications for protection have not (yet) 
been denied, many will nonetheless not be eligible to work legally in 
the United States even if they have reached the age of majority.318 
At the same time, the rhetoric regarding these children has changed 
dramatically.  There has undoubtedly been a rash of extreme violence 
in certain parts of the country that appears to be tied to gang violence 
with certain roots in Central America.319  Government officials have 
been quick to suggest UACs are, across the board, affiliated with such 
violent gangs and responsible for the harms that have befallen some 
                                                          
315. See STATISTICS YEARBOOK, supra note 33, at 33 (providing in absentia 
removal rates for UACs), 14 (providing substantive outcomes but not specifying rates 
for UACs). 
316. Id. at 8-9 (reporting that as of the conclusion of fiscal year 2017, there are 
over 650,000 cases pending before the immigration courts nationwide). 
317. See Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982); FACTS AND DATA, supra note 
4 (reporting that for the last several years at least two-third of UACs have been fifteen 
years old or older). 
318. Those with pending applications for adjustment of status may be granted 
work authorization. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(9) (2019). But, given the backlog in visas 
for special immigrant juveniles from Central America, UACs may have to wait years 
before they can file their applications for adjustment of status (and the corresponding 
application for employment authorization). See FEBRUARY 2019 VISA BULLETIN, 
supra note 243, at 4. Similarly, those with pending applications for asylum can 
eventually apply for employment authorization.  8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(8).  But, any 
misstep by the applicant that delays the application, even inadvertently, may 
indefinitely delay eligibility for employment authorization.  Id. § 208.7. 
319. See, e.g., Liz Robbins & Nadia T. Rodriguez, The Gang Murders in the 
Long Island Suburbs, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/12/nyregion/ms-13-murders-long-island.html. 
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living in those communities.320  Yet, this rhetoric fails to recognize 
recently-arrived UACs are often the community members most 
vulnerable to the harms being perpetrated.321  To their horrid surprise, 
UACs who fled the violence of their home countries may have found 
the violence preceded them and awaits them here in the United 
States.322 
It would be naïve and dishonest to suggest that of the hundreds of 
thousands of UACs who arrived to the United States in recent years, 
none have violent pasts or bad intentions.323  However, it is equally 
insidious to suggest all or most or many of these children do have such 
aspects.324  Such a false narrative, combined with the tactics discussed 
above, has been and will continue to be a powerful tool.  When fleeing 
children are no longer seen as vulnerable but rather as criminals, 
malefactors, and—most disturbingly—”animals,”325 it becomes easier 
for society to accept the idea these children should not be protected 
from almost certain harm and death upon deportation. 
With that, the myth that UACs arrive to the United States to harm 
us justifies the decision to do everything possible to expel them.  
Notwithstanding conclusions by the international agency designated by 
the United Nations to protect those fleeing and the clear instruction by 
Congress to protect all UACs, protection will elude their grasp.  This, 
in turn, will push them further from mainstream society.  Told that they 
have few prospects to remain permanently in the United States, that 
they may not express their human dignity by sustaining themselves, and 
having their very status as human beings denigrated, many will likely 
slip from one legal limbo—being the subject of long-pending 
immigration court proceedings—to another—being another noncitizen 
present in the United States with no prospects of ever becoming a full 
member of our community.  Should that happen, we will indeed have 
scores of newly arrived, young immigrants who are permanent 
                                                          
320. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 3. 
321. See, e.g., Jonathan Blitzer, How Gang Victims Are Labeled as Gang 
Suspects, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 23, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-gang-victims-are-labelled-as-
gang-suspects. 
322. See id. 
323. Id. 
324. Cf., e.g., Children on the Run, supra note 4. 
325. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 3. 
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outsiders to our community—permanently excluded, permanently 
marginalized, and permanently vulnerable. 
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